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 THE LAW AGAINST FAMILY SEPARATION 
Carrie F. Cordero, Heidi Li Feldman, Chimène I. Keitner* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article offers the first comprehensive assessment of how 
domestic and international law limits the U.S. government’s ability to 
separate foreign children from the adults accompanying them when 
they seek to enter the United States. As early as March 6, 2017, then-
Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer 
that he was considering separating families at the border as a 
deterrent to illegal immigration as part of a “zero tolerance” policy 
whereby the Trump administration intended the strictest 
enforcement of immigration law against those migrants coming to the 
U.S. southern border. Kelly did not say upon what legal basis the 
administration could lawfully separate families at the border as a 
component of its immigration policies. Whatever the merits of 
maximal prosecution of adults unlawfully crossing the border, 
adopting this policy did not convert family separation into a lawful 
byproduct of the arrest of an adult. To the contrary, domestic and 
international law militates strongly against the lawfulness of family 
separation as a tool for immigration deterrence, yielding liability for 
the state and for individuals who implement family separation in this 
setting. Both litigation and Congressional action can and should play 
a role in addressing the Trump administration’s use of family 
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separation and ensuring that it is halted now and not used again, by 
Trump or any other U.S. President.  
In the Article, we start with a factual chronology of the 
Trump Administration’s family separation policy. We then argue for 
our positions regarding the illegality of the policy and its 
implementation. In Part II, we describe the federal government’s 
recognized authority to enforce immigration laws and ensure border 
security, on the one hand, and the domestic constitutional framework 
for protecting the basic rights of migrant parents and children, on the 
other. In Part III we examine the reach of domestic law, including the 
common law of torts, for dealing with wrongful family separation in 
the immigration setting. Part IV reviews international law that 
protects against this harm. In the Conclusion we propose a range of 
steps that the U.S. Congress could take to repair at least some of the 
harm caused by the family separation policy, and to ensure that no 
future administration contemplates similar action. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an interview on March 6, 2017, then-Secretary of 
Homeland Security John Kelly told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer that he was 
considering separating families at the border as a deterrent to illegal 
immigration.1 Multiple administration officials have since stated 
publicly that the purpose of the separations was to serve as a 
deterrent.2 This rationale was repeated even though evidence does 
not support the idea that such policies have a deterrent effect.3 
                                                                                                             
1.  The Situation Room (@CNNSitRoom), TWITTER (Mar. 6, 2017, 2:24 PM), 
https://twitter.com/CNNSitRoom/status/838877868453064704 [https://perma.cc/ 
55GL-8C6T]. In the interview, Wolf Blitzer asked, “Are you considering a new 
initiative that would separate children from their parents if they try to enter the 
United States illegally?” Kelly responded, “I would do almost anything to deter 
the people from Central America [from] getting on this very, very dangerous 
network [that facilitates movement through Mexico to the United States]. . . . Yes, 
I am considering in order to deter . . . exactly that, they will be well cared for as we 
deal with their parents.” (emphasis added). 
2.  See, e.g., David Shepardson, Trump Says Family Separations Deter 
Illegal Immigration, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-immigration-trump/trump-says-family-separations-deter-illegal-immigration-
idUSKCN1MO00C [https://perma.cc/5SHY-UMBB] (reporting that Trump 
articulated the deterrence rationale); Beth Van Schaack, New Proof Surfaces That 
Family Separation Was About Deterrence and Punishment, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 
27, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/61621/proof-surfaces-family-separation-
deterrence-punishment/ [https://perma.cc/4AMR-9273] (reporting on government 
documents that “reveal that the underlying intent” of the family separation policy 
was “to deter additional immigration and asylum petitions”); Philip Bump, Here 
Are the Administration Officials Who Have Said that Family Separation Is Meant 
as a Deterrent, WASH. POST (June 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/politics/wp/2018/06/19/here-are-the-administration-officials-who-have-said-
that-family-separation-is-meant-as-a-deterrent/ (on file with the Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review) (noting that multiple officials, including former 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Steven Wagner, Acting Assistant Secretary 
for Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services, stated 
that the policy served as a deterrent); see also Nick Miroff, Acting Homeland 
Security Chief Frustrated and Isolated—Even as He Delivers What Trump Wants 
at the Border, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
immigration/acting-homeland-security-chief-frustrated-and-isolated--even-as-he-
delivers-what-trump-wants-at-the-border/2019/10/01/b62e740c-e3ad-11e9-b403-
f738899982d2_story (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) 
(reporting that Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin McAleenan, one of 
the original architects of the zero tolerance prosecution policy, later determined 
that the family separations “went too far”). 
3.  See, e.g., Tom K. Wong, Do Family Separation and Detention Deter 
Immigration?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 24, 2018), https://www.american 
progress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2018/07/24/453660/family-separation-
detention-deter-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/75HB-KWJU] (finding that both 
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Nevertheless, from the very early days of the Trump 
Administration, the senior official in charge of enforcing immigration 
laws acknowledged that what later became known as the family 
separation policy was intended to be a harsh mechanism of 
enforcement—so harsh, in fact, that the administration apparently 
believed and hoped it would deter future migration over the southern 
border. What was left unresolved at the time was upon what legal 
basis the administration could lawfully separate families at the 
border—without any assurance of limited duration or promise of 
reunification—as a component of its immigration and border security 
policies. 
This Article offers the first comprehensive assessment of how 
domestic and international law limits the U.S. government’s ability to 
separate families when they seek to enter the United States. To be 
sure, bona fide concerns about children’s safety and increased 
awareness of the problem of human trafficking mean that some 
children were likely also separated from accompanying adults prior to 
2017. To our knowledge, however, the U.S. government’s policies and 
practices beginning in 2018 represent the first time the United States 
deliberately separated arriving migrant and asylum-seeking families 
as a tactic for deterring migration. Moreover, it quickly became clear 
that the government had no plans to reunify families, or even to track 
which children in the government’s custody had originally arrived 
with their parents or relatives and had been forcibly separated from 
them. The conditions of confinement of these children—and their 
accompanying adults—have been well publicized.4 In response to the 
                                                                                                             
family separation and family detention “have been shown to be ineffective 
deterrents”); Adam Cox & Ryan Goodman, Detention of Migrant Families as 
“Deterrence”: Ethical Flaws and Empirical Doubts, JUST SECURITY (June 22, 
2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/58354/detention-migrant-families-deterrence-
ethical-flaws-empirical-doubts/ [https://perma.cc/2LCS-W74L] (arguing that 
available evidence not only fails to establish a causal link between U.S. detention 
policies and border crossings, but also that “there’s not even a correlational 
relationship”); Karen Musalo & Eunice Lee, Seeking a Rational Approach to a 
Regional Refugee Crisis: Lessons from the Summer 2014 “Surge” of Central 
American Women and Children at the US-Mexico Border, 5 J. MIGRATION & HUM. 
SEC. 137, 139 (2017) (arguing that Obama-era policies aimed at deterrence, 
including family detention, expedited removal, accelerated proceedings, and raids, 
were unsuccessful in disincentivizing migration into the United States because 
the true causes were “push” factors in migrants’ home countries). 
4.  See, e.g., Grace Segers & Graham Kates, Watchdog Details Psychological 
Trauma Among Migrant Children Separated from Families, CBS NEWS (Sept. 4, 
2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hhs-inspector-general-report-details-
psychological-trauma-among-separated-migrant-children/ [http://perma.cc/84ME-
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public outcry over the separation of families, the government 
announced a policy of potentially indefinite family detention that is 
not consistent with the long-standing court-supervised agreement5 
specifying time limits on children’s detention and basic standards of 
treatment for immigrant children and families.6 In September 2019, a 
judge enjoined that new policy of indefinite family detention.7 As this 
                                                                                                             
ZLQS] (providing information on reports issued by the Office of Inspector General 
and Department of Health and Human Services on the psychological effects of 
family separation on children); Camilo Montoya-Galvez, New Pictures Show 
“Dangerous Overcrowding” at Border Patrol Facilities in Texas, CBS NEWS (July 
2, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dhs-inspector-general-report-reveals-
squalid-conditions-at-migrant-detention-centers/ [https://perma.cc/QQT7-7J3W] 
(documenting conditions at detention centers); Lizzie O’Leary, “Children Were 
Dirty, They Were Scared, and They Were Hungry,” An Immigration Attorney 
Describes What She Witnessed at the Border, ATLANTIC (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/06/child-detention-centers-
immigration-attorney-interview/592540/ (on file with the Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review) (same). 
5.  See Flores v. Sessions, 862 F.3d 863, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2017). The Flores 
Settlement Agreement was reached in 1997 (and subsequently modified) as a 
result of advocacy litigation challenging the duration and conditions of 
government detention of migrant minors. The settlement over time has provided 
that children may only be detained for twenty days; after that, the government 
must release them to family members or other suitable care, such as a licensed 
facility. The Trump Administration has encouraged Congress to act to relieve the 
government of the requirements placed on it by the Flores settlement. 
Simultaneously, it has sought court relief from the agreement’s requirements. The 
government argues it should be able to detain families in immigration processing 
indefinitely pending the adjudication of their immigration proceedings. See SARAH 
HERMAN PECK & BEN HARRINGTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45297, THE 
“FLORES SETTLEMENT” AND ALIEN FAMILIES APPREHENDED AT THE U.S. BORDER: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/ 
R45297.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3CD-5L3J]. In August 2019, (former) Acting 
Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin McAleenan and Secretary of Health and 
Human Services Alex Azar announced new proposed regulations in response to 
the Flores settlement that would enable the government to hold children and 
families for longer than 20 days. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Security, DHS and HHS Announce New Rule to Implement the Flores Settlement 
Agreement; Final Rule Published to Fulfill Obligations Under Flores Settlement 
Agreement (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/08/21/dhs-and-hhs-
announce-new-rule-implement-flores-settlement-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/Y3C7-TCVB]. 
6.  See Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Migrant Families Would 
Face Indefinite Detention Under New Trump Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/us/politics/flores-migrant-family-detention. 
html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
7.  See Miriam Jordan, Judge Blocks Trump Administration Plan to Detain 
Migrant Children, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/ 
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article went to press, the case is pending before the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. A coalition of Attorneys General from 
nineteen states and the District of Columbia filed an amicus brief 
urging the Court to uphold the injunction.8 
Comprehensively assessing the law against family separation 
is a complex undertaking. The underlying practice—deliberate, 
harsh, and large-scale family separation as a deterrent to migration 
or intended lawful immigration—is unparalleled in U.S. history, so it 
is not necessarily obvious which bodies of law apply, and how. As it 
turns out, many types of law prohibit this practice, though some could 
use bolstering by congressional action. The Article, therefore, is a 
broad survey of applicable areas of law with concrete discussion of 
how to use them. We look at an expansive range of currently 
applicable law, consider the viability of different specific legal 
approaches, and make an initial effort to identify the kind of federal 
legislation that could address the Trump Administration’s family 
separation policies and practice beyond the important and 
consequential litigation that has already been brought. 
We begin with what happened. Part I of this Article provides 
a summary of the Trump Administration’s implementation of family 
separation, and early legal challenges to that activity. Our legal 
analysis begins with Part II, which describes the federal 
government’s authority to enforce immigration laws and ensure 
border security, on the one hand, and the constitutional framework 
for protecting the basic rights of migrant parents and children, on the 
other.9 Part III addresses the reach of domestic civil law for dealing 
                                                                                                             
27/us/migrant-children-flores-court.html (on file with the Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review). 
8.  For more information on the status of the Flores injunction, see Vermont 
Joins Fight to Maintain Rights of Children in Detention, VT. BUS. MAG. (Jan. 29, 
2020), https://vermontbiz.com/news/2020/january/29/vermont-joins-fight-
maintain-rights-children-immigration-detention [https://perma.cc/F4KK-Q3WN]. 
9.  In this Article, we use the term “migrant” to describe individuals who 
enter the United States by crossing an international border. This category 
includes asylum-seekers who are entitled to additional protections under both 
domestic and international law, as described below. It does not include refugees 
whose applications are processed overseas, and who are subsequently admitted to, 
and resettled in, the United States. It is not possible to determine whether a given 
migrant who has crossed the border is an asylum-seeker without an 
individualized assessment, nor is it possible to determine without an 
individualized assessment whether an asylum-seeker is, in fact, legally entitled to 
receive asylum. The question of whether other categories of migrants, such as 
those fleeing natural disasters or the collapse of the rule of law, should also be 
accorded special legal protection lies outside the scope of this Article. Other 
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with wrongful family separation in the context of immigration 
enforcement. Part IV assesses the international legal framework 
governing the United States’ treatment of migrant children and 
families. Our analysis shows that a policy or practice of separating 
families at the border as an immigration deterrent is an 
impermissible infringement on due process rights, is open to 
challenge under several theories of civil liability, and is inconsistent 
with principles of international law. While the federal government 
unquestionably is authorized to regulate immigration and enforce 
border security, that enforcement must be exercised consistent with 
fundamental constitutional principles of due process and family 
integrity, as well as an over-arching anti-dehumanization principle. 
This Article explains that the U.S. government may not 
indiscriminately remove children from their parents, or parents from 
their children, for a potentially indeterminate period of time as a 
deliberate deterrent to immigration. The Article concludes that 
violations of these basic constitutional rights can and should be 
afforded remedies in the form of civil relief, and that Congress should 
take legislative action to remedy past harm and to prevent future 
abuses. 
I. THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S POLICY TO 
SEPARATE FAMILIES AT THE SOUTHERN BORDER TO DETER 
MIGRATION 
The family separation policy was not an aberration; it was the 
culmination of processes set in motion during the 2016 campaign and 
soon after the new administration took office. A central feature of the 
2016 Trump presidential campaign was its emphasis on limiting 
immigration and stopping the flow of Central American migrants into 
the United States via the southern border with Mexico.10 Within days 
of assuming office, President Trump took executive action to limit 
immigration. On January 25, 2017, he signed Executive Order 13767, 
which, among other things, directed the immediate commencement of 
                                                                                                             
immigration-related measures, such as the “Remain in Mexico” program, the 
attempt to allow “expedited removal” nationwide, and the drastic reduction in 
refugee admissions also lie beyond this Article’s scope. 
10.  See Nick Corasaniti, A Look at Trump’s Immigration Plan, Then and 
Now, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/ 
31/us/politics/donald-trump-immigration-changes.html (on file with the Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review); Don Gonyea, Trump’s Plan to ‘Make Mexico Pay’ for 
the Wall, NPR (April 5, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/05/473109475/trumps-
plan-to-make-mexico-pay-for-the-wall [https://perma.cc/7QFN-S2EU]. 
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(i) constructing a wall on the southern border, (ii) expediting 
immigration processing, and (iii) taking other steps to increase border 
security and immigration law enforcement.11 That same day, the 
president issued Executive Order 13768, which, among other things, 
directed full enforcement of immigration laws and the withholding of 
federal funds from so-called sanctuary cities.12 To implement the 
president’s orders, on February 20, 2017, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security sent an implementation memorandum to senior Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) officials, including the Acting General 
Counsel and the acting officials in charge of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 
and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The memo 
provided that, among other things, the “Department would no longer 
exempt classes or categories of removable aliens from potential 
enforcement,” would hire thousands more agents and officers, and 
would no longer afford privacy law protections to those who were not 
either U.S. citizens or lawful residents.13 
Over the course of the next year, the Trump Administration 
struggled to implement its intended immigration and border security 
policies, in part due to the haste with which the policies were 
executed. The policies were not subject to typical interagency 
coordination among the various parts of the Executive Branch, 
including relevant stakeholders such as the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of State. In 
part because of this lack of internal process and interagency 
consultation, legal challenges to the original “travel ban” executive 
order succeeded in forcing the Administration to scale back some of 
its original intended activities.14 By the spring of 2018, however, the 
                                                                                                             
11.  Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-border-security-
immigration-enforcement-improvements/ [https://perma.cc/LH6U-NEZV]. 
12.  Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-
interior-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/D7LP-EGRX]. 
13.  Memorandum from Secretary John Kelly to Senior Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Officials (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-
Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UWR-H5DP]. 
14.  See Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-protecting-
nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states-2/; Carrie Cordero & Quinta Jurecic, 
From the Travel Ban to Family Separations: Malevolence, Incompetence, 
Carelessness, LAWFARE (July 3, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/travel-ban-
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Administration had developed a new approach to effectuate its 
immigration policy objectives. On April 6, 2018, President Trump 
directed the end of a practice derogatively referred to as “catch and 
release,” which permitted border authorities to release apprehended 
aliens suspected of being unlawfully present in the United States and 
to allow them to remain within U.S. territory during the adjudication 
of their immigration status, which could take many months or even 
years.15 That same day, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced a 
policy of “zero tolerance” or “100 percent prosecution,” meaning that 
every instance of unauthorized entry or attempted unauthorized 
entry into the U.S. would be prosecuted by the DOJ.16 This approach 
abandoned the longstanding U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) policy 
and practice to focus prosecutorial resources on cases of defendants 
who were unlawfully present in the United States and had been 
convicted of a serious crime or posed a legitimate public safety 
concern. 
This new prosecutorial guideline was a substantial departure 
from traditional DOJ practice.17 The Attorney General directed 
                                                                                                             
family-separations-malevolence-incompetence-carelessness [https://perma.cc/ 
X8ML-UQ4M]. 
15.  Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services and 
the Attorney General on ending “Catch and Release” at the Border, WHITE HOUSE 




16.  Memorandum for Federal Prosecutors Along the Southwest Border, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1049751/download [https://perma.cc/4BDZ-LXM2]; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Announces Zero Tolerance Policy for Criminal 
Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-
announces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/PMY3-
8M83]. The government’s position has been that those entering at ports of entry 
seeking lawful entry would not be prosecuted. But, at the same time, the 
government implemented a metering practice that limited the ability of migrants 
to seek lawful entry. See Stephanie Leutert, What ‘Metering’ Really Looks Like in 
South Texas, LAWFARE (July 17, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-
metering-really-looks-south-texas [https://perma.cc/7VPY-K75U]. 
17.  See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1042–43 (1984) (“[I]t must 
be acknowledged that only a small percentage of arrests of aliens are intended or 
expected to lead to criminal prosecutions.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Justice Department Smashes Records for Violent Crime, Gun Crime, 
Illegal Immigration Prosecutions, Increases Drug and White Collar Prosecutions 
(Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-smashes-
records-violent-crime-gun-crime-illegal-immigration-prosecutions [https://perma. 
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border region U.S. Attorneys’ Offices to “adopt a policy to prosecute 
all Department of Homeland Security referrals” of attempted illegal 
entry and illegal entry, “to the extent practicable.”18 Once adult aliens 
were referred by DHS to DOJ for prosecution and placed into adult 
facilities, they could no longer be detained along with children.19 
Accordingly, government agents reclassified those children who had 
arrived with an adult now subject to prosecution as unaccompanied 
minors, even though they had not, in reality, entered the U.S. 
unaccompanied. Once classified as “unaccompanied,” the children, in 
accordance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act,20 were taken into government custody, resulting in their 
potentially indefinite detention: first with CBP, and then, according 
to law and protocols, under the supervision of HHS. Meanwhile, DHS 
publicly denied that it had a family separation policy, stating in a 
press release that “DHS does not have a blanket policy of separating 
families at the border.”21 Yet, the same DHS press release, entitled 
                                                                                                             
cc/UW8E-2S2D] (citing a 38% increase in illegal entry prosecutions in 2018). For 
an example of earlier DOJ prosecution guidelines in one U.S. Attorney’s Office, 
see Data Source: United States Courts, WALL STREET J., http://wsj.com/public/ 
resources/documents/DAG2106-2166.pdf [https://perma.cc/54NY-Q3VX]. 
18.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Announces Zero-
Tolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-entry 
[https://perma.cc/MC3B-3WPX]. 
19.  See Family Separation and Detention, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www. 
americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/immig
ration/familyseparation/ [https://perma.cc/SU25-RXVZ] (“Since children cannot be 
held in criminal detention, the children are designated as ‘unaccompanied alien 
children’ and placed in the custody of the Department of Health and Human 
Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). ORR places the children in 
shelters until they are released.”); Why Are Families Being Separated at the 
Border?, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 13, 2018), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/ 
blog/why-are-families-being-separated-at-the-border-an-explainer/ (“When adults 
are detained and prosecuted in the criminal justice system for immigration 
offenses, their children cannot, by law, be housed with them in criminal jails, so 
the family unit is separated.”) 
20.  William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008). 
21.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Myth vs. Fact: DHS 
Zero Tolerance Policy (June 18, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/06/18/ 
myth-vs-fact-dhs-zero-tolerance-policy [https://perma.cc/VCL8-AKW5]. In 
addition, Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen tweeted, “We do not have a policy of 
separating families at the border. Period.” DHS Sec. Kirstjen Nielsen Denies 
Family Separation Policy Exists, Blames Media, CBS NEWS (June 18, 2018), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dhs-sec-kirstjen-nielsen-denies-family-separation-
policy-exists-blames-media/ [https://perma.cc/U7PH-DYFK]. 
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“Myths vs. Facts,” acknowledged the consequences of the zero 
tolerance policy: once charged, an alien adult will be transferred to 
the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service, and “children will be 
classified as an unaccompanied child and transferred to” HHS 
custody.22 Thus, the new government policy intentionally created a 
bureaucratic fiction, as many children classified as unaccompanied 
had, in fact, entered the U.S. with a parent or family member. 
Despite DHS’s effort to justify the practice, the President 
issued Executive Order 13841, which purported to end the family 
separation policy that DHS leadership said did not exist.23 The order 
directed the Secretary of DHS to “maintain custody of alien families 
during the pendency of any criminal improper entry or immigration 
proceedings” unless joint detention presented a risk to the child.24 The 
next day, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a motion requesting 
modification of the Flores25 settlement which, as described further 
below, has been pivotal for protecting migrant families and children 
from prolonged detention. 
As a result of the above chain of events, litigation and press 
reports indicate that the Trump Administration has likely separated 
over 2,500 children from their families at the border as part of the 
enhanced enforcement effort mandated by the zero tolerance policy.26 
The number of children separated from the beginning of the 
administration through August 2019 appears to be at least 4,000, and 
may be higher.27 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued 
                                                                                                             
22.  U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 21. 
23.  Exec. Order No. 13841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29435 (June 20, 2018). 
24.  Id. 
25.  Flores v. Sessions, 862 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2017). 
26.  In addition, the Ms. L. litigation (discussed infra note 27) has revealed 
that family separations took place even before the zero tolerance policy 
announcement in April 2018 as a sort of pilot program. As a result, the numbers 
of children actually separated has continued to grow over time. See Family 
Separation by the Numbers, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-
rights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/family-separation [https://perma.cc/ 
2UDK-XRUM]. 
27.  The Ms. L. agreement reveals that there were an original 2,737 
separated children. See infra note 28. The New York Times reported an additional 
700 children separated. See Miriam Jordan, Family Separation May Have Hit 
Thousands More Migrant Children than Reported, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/us/family-separation-trump-administration-
migrants.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). However, 
the government’s lack of accurate record keeping has resulted in reports of 
possible thousands of additional unknown separated children. See Miriam Jordan, 
No More Family Separations, Except These 900, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2019), 
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the government in the Southern District of California to end the 
practice of family separation and, on June 26, 2018, a federal district 
court judge ordered families reunited, a process that has been 
ongoing for over a year, despite continued court supervision.28 As 
Judge Dana M. Sabraw stated in his order granting the preliminary 
injunction: 
[T]here is no genuine dispute that the government 
was not prepared to accommodate the mass influx of 
separated children. Measures were not in place to 
provide for communication between governmental 
agencies responsible for detaining parents and those 
responsible for housing children, or to provide for 
ready communication between separated parents and 
children. There was no reunification plan in place and 
families have been separated for months.29 
Throughout 2018, ongoing litigation highlighted the 
continued detention of migrant children, and the lack of processes in 
place to promptly reunite them with family members. Reports 
continued to indicate that family separation was taking place and 
reunification efforts were not keeping pace with judicial orders.30 By 
the summer of 2019, public attention had shifted from concerns about 
the fact of detention to outrage at the conditions under which migrant 
children were being detained in some facilities. Reports that children 
were being detained in U.S. government custody without adequate 
access to humanitarian items such as food, blankets, and 
toothbrushes, resulted in renewed attention from some members of 
Congress, press reports, and congressional hearings.31 In July 2019, 
                                                                                                             
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/30/us/migrant-family-separations.html (on file 
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (reporting 900 further separations 
since Judge Sabraw’s injunction). We expect these statistics may continue to shift 
as more information is revealed through continued litigation and press reporting. 
28.  See Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133 
(S.D. Cal. 2018) (order granting plaintiffs’ motion for classwide preliminary 
injunction). 
29.  Id at 1136–37. 
30.  CNN Newsroom (@CNNNewsroom), TWITTER (Aug. 22, 2019, 8:43 AM), 
https://twitter.com/CNNnewsroom/status/1164563704781967360 [https://perma. 
cc/P3M8-CNQB] (“Family separations are ‘still going on,’ says ACLU lawyer Lee 
Gelernt, adding that he is going back to the San Diego court on September 13, 
with the hope that the judge ‘will put a halt to it.’”). 
31.  Caitlin Dickerson, ‘There Is a Stench:’ Soiled Clothes and No Baths for 
Migrant Children at a Texas Center, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/migrant-children-border-soap.html (on file with the 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
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after media reports exposed inadequate conditions, a federal facility 
in Clint, Texas was emptied of the resident children only to have 
dozens more relocated back to the facility within days.32 Meanwhile, 
the government has never provided a sound legal rationale for 
creating and implementing a blanket policy of separating families 
seeking entry into the United States as a deterrent mechanism to 
discourage migration and enforce border security. The next section 
provides context for the government’s exercise of its immigration and 
border functions, and identifies certain constitutional limitations on 
the conduct of those enforcement efforts. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
A discussion of limits on the federal government’s ability to 
design and carry out immigration and border security measures first 
needs to take stock of its affirmative authority in these specific areas. 
As discussed below, the federal government is on solid footing when it 
claims significant powers, but this does not mean that it can exercise 
those powers free from legal boundaries. 
A. U.S. Government Authority to Regulate Immigration and 
Protect the Border 
Intense policy debates over immigration and border 
enforcement are not new in U.S. history. Societal, political and legal 
questions surrounding the arrival of migrant laborers and 
immigrants of various ethnic backgrounds have been around nearly 
as long as the United States itself. The U.S. has a long history of 
periodically welcoming migrant laborers, followed by periods of 
increased deportations and attempts to limit both legal and illegal 
immigration.33 The early to mid-19th century witnessed reactions 
                                                                                                             
32.  See Simon Romero et al., Hungry, Scared and Sick: Inside the Migrant 
Detention Center at Clint, TX, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www. 
nytimes.com/interactive/2019/07/06/us/migrants-border-patrol-clint.html (on file 
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review); see also Arturo Rubio & Caitlin 
Dickerson, We’re in a Dark Place: Children Returned to Troubled Texas Border 
Facility, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/us/ 
john-sanders-cbp.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) 
(reporting on transfer of children from Clint, Texas). 
33.  For example, the Deportation Act of 1929 resulted in the repatriation of 
approximately 100,000 Mexicans back to Mexico. When farm labor was in greater 
need during WWII, a new agreement was reached between the United States and 
Mexico to permit increased migration for work purposes. Once the war was over 
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against immigrating Irish and German laborers.34 In the mid- to late 
19th century, immigration enforcement was focused on the influx of 
Chinese laborers, resulting in the extreme measures of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act in 1882 and the Geary Act of 1892, laws motivated by 
racial and ethnic prejudice.35 Early 20th century border security 
efforts focused on unauthorized entry from both the Mexican and 
Canadian borders.36  
The authority of the federal government to regulate 
immigration and enforce border security is rooted in the Constitution. 
Congress’ authority to pass immigration laws comes from Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution, which confers on Congress the 
responsibility to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. Article II 
provides the executive with the authority to enforce the law and 
provide for the national security as commander in chief. Congress 
explicitly granted the executive branch specific authority to control 
immigration and border security in the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA), the comprehensive federal law governing immigration 
authorities, agencies, processes and procedures.37 Immigration law 
provides a framework and process for detention and removal of aliens 
who are not lawfully present on U.S. territory.38 Federal agents 
responsible for enforcing the immigration laws are authorized to stop, 
interrogate, arrest, and pursue proceedings against aliens who are 
known to be, or suspected of being, unlawfully present.39 Absent 
certain exceptions, aliens who have entered the U.S. without legal 
permission can be removed after appropriate proceedings.40 Unlawful 
                                                                                                             
and the need for Mexican labor decreased, a new wave of deportation enforcement 
took place in the early 1950s, resulting in the apprehension of a million Mexicans 
and the deportation of tens of thousands. See JAMES R. PHELPS ET AL., BORDER 
SECURITY 91–94 (2d ed. 2018). 
34.  Ron Elving, With Latest Nativist Rhetoric, Trump Takes America Back 
to Where It Came From, NPR (July 16, 2019), https://www.npr.org/ 
2019/07/16/742000247/with-latest-nativist-rhetoric-trump-takes-america-back-to-
where-it-came-from [https://perma.cc/VX4K-FNDK]. 
35.  See PHELPS ET AL., supra note 33, at 72. 
36.  See id. at 68. 
37.  Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1107 (2018). 
38.  8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2018) (detention and removal of aliens ordered 
removed). 
39.  8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2018) (powers of immigration officers and employees), 
8 C.F.R. § 287 (2002) (exercise of power by immigration officers). 
40.  8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2018) (deportable aliens). 
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presence is a civil, not criminal offense,41 while improper entry is 
treated as a crime that can result in a fine or up to six months’ 
imprisonment for a first offense.42 There are criminal penalties for re-
entering illegally, or re-entering following conviction of a crime.43 
The federal government has an extensive structure designed 
to administer and enforce its immigration and border security laws. 
Historically, agencies that were involved in immigration and border 
enforcement were spread across the executive branch. The Border 
Patrol was created in 1924 as part of the Labor Department, due to 
the close nexus between illegal immigration and migrant labor.44 At 
the turn of the twentieth century, an early version of an immigration 
office was located in the Treasury Department; that later became the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), re-located to the 
Department of Justice in 1940. Since 2003, immigration and border 
enforcement has been the responsibility of DHS. The former  
INS—which used to report to the Attorney General—was dismantled. 
It was relocated by an act of Congress to DHS and split into three 
entities: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (including the 
Border Patrol45 and the Office of Field Operations focused on ports of 
entry), U.S. Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) (handling 
civil immigration processing) and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) (responsible for investigations, detention, removal 
and enforcement).46 
The Supreme Court has recognized that competing societal 
interests and individual rights must be taken into account when 
enforcing immigration laws as part of border security.47 In addition to 
                                                                                                             
41.  8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2018) (inadmissible aliens); see also Arizona v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2018) (holding that it is not a crime for a removable 
alien to remain in the U.S.) 
42.  8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2018). 
43.  8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2018). 
44.  See PHELPS ET AL., supra note 33, at 68–69. 
45.  See id. at 68. Border Patrol has grown from over 4,000 agents in 1993 to 
over 23,000 agents in 2018. CBP, which includes Border Patrol, is currently the 
largest federal law enforcement agency in the country. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 




46.  See PHELPS ET AL., supra note 33, at 88–94. ICE currently has 
approximately 20,000 agents, of which 6,700 are assigned to Homeland Security 
Investigations (HSI). Id. 
47.  United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (noting 
there are “limits on search and seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and 
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federal statutes providing agencies and officers with specific border 
enforcement authorities, current Fourth Amendment doctrine 
illuminates the wide discretion that has been granted to the federal 
government to enforce border security. For example, in certain 
circumstances, federal government agents may conduct warrantless 
searches in the context of border protection—they must only be a 
reasonable distance from the border for this border search exception 
to the warrant requirement to apply.48 The Court also allows border 
patrol checkpoints in the interior of the United States, subject to 
certain limits.49 Despite the extensive permissible enforcement 
regime, however, there are constitutional limits to what the 
government can do in the name of immigration enforcement. For 
example, ethnic appearance alone is insufficient grounds for border 
agents to stop a vehicle and question the occupants about their 
immigration status, even when the vehicle is near the physical 
border.50 In a significant case, the Supreme Court evaluated whether 
the government’s border security justification for stopping and 
questioning drivers of apparent Mexican ancestry or ethnicity 
outweighed those individuals’ liberty rights, and the rights of lawful 
citizens to not be stopped without more substantial justification. The 
Court found that it did not.51 Thus, even in an acknowledged area of 
substantial executive authority—border security—the executive’s 
authority is not unbounded. 
Courts have made it clear that federal authority significantly 
outweighs state authority in enforcing immigration law.52 During the 
twentieth century, the federal government’s primacy in immigration 
went relatively unchallenged.53 In the first part of the twenty-first 
                                                                                                             
oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal 
security of individuals.”). 
48.  See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 281 (1973). 
49.  Id. at 295. 
50.  See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1968) 
(weighing the valid public interest in enforcing immigration laws against rights of 
individual liberty). 
51.  Id. (weighing concerns with liberty rights, including rights of citizens to 
transit without unreasonable traffic delays). 
52.  See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freedman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (indicating 
that “[t]he passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of 
foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States”). 
53.  Although uncommon at the time, California passed an immigration-
related law in 1971 providing for civil penalties for employing illegal aliens if the 
employment would adversely affect “lawful resident workers.” Arizona v. United 
States, 567 U.S. 387, 493 (2012) (California’s law withstood a preemption 
challenge, but that was prior to increased federal legislation on the issue). 
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century, however, states and localities have attempted to insert 
themselves into immigration enforcement.54 On one end of the 
spectrum, certain cities have passed “sanctuary city” laws, intended 
to protect foreigners residing in the United States without legal 
status.55 On the other end of the political spectrum, state 
governments have sought to assert a role for themselves in clamping 
down on illegal immigration. Arizona was the first state to pass 
federal-like immigration legislation during this time period.56 Others 
have included Indiana, Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina.57 The 
Supreme Court considered whether Arizona’s attempts to enforce its 
own immigration laws were permissible, and found that three of four 
provisions were an improper encroachment on the federal 
government’s primacy in making and enforcing immigration law.58 In 
2011, South Carolina’s legislature passed, and then-Governor Nikki 
Haley signed into law several measures intended to address 
immigration issues.59 These measures included criminal laws, 
employment laws, and mandates to law enforcement to report 
individuals suspected of being in the United States illegally.60 In 
some states, the law mirrored or closely tracked federal immigration 
law.61 State legislators recognized they were treading close to, if not 
                                                                                                             
54.  United States v. South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d 898, 906 (D.S.C. 
2011). 
55.  See Darla Cameron, How Sanctuary Cities Work, and How Trump’s 
Blocked Executive Order Could Have Affected Them, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/sanctuary-cities/ (on file with 
the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).  
56.  Id. at 906. 
57.  Id. at 906–07. 
58.  See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395, 402, 406, 409; see also id. at 394 (“[T]he 
Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of 
immigration and the status of aliens.”). The court assumed that the federal 
government would develop and execute its immigration law authority responsibly. 
See id. at 414 (“The National Government has significant power to regulate 
immigration. With power comes responsibility, and the sound exercise of national 
power over immigration depends on the Nation’s meeting its responsibility to base 
its laws on a political will informed by searching, thoughtful, rational civic 
discourse.”). 
59.  S. 20, 2011 Leg., 119th Sess. 2011 S.C. Acts 69 (preemption of local 
ordinances regarding immigration). 
60.  Robbie Brown, Parts of Immigration Law Blocked in South Carolina, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/us/judge-blocks-
parts-of-south-carolinas-immigration-law.html (on file with the Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review). 
61.  United States v. South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d 898, 905 (D.S.C. 
2011). 
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over, the line of the federal government’s authority.62 The federal 
government (in addition to advocacy groups) challenged these 
measures, and a district court held, with respect to the specific 
sections of the South Carolina law being challenged, that federal 
immigration law preempts state attempts to regulate immigration.63 
The Eleventh Circuit similarly disallowed much of the immigration 
enforcement provisions attempted by the state of Alabama.64 In some 
cases, the courts gave states more time to determine how the state 
laws would be implemented before enjoining the enforcement efforts 
altogether. Given established precedent recognizing the federal 
government’s primacy in developing and enforcing immigration laws, 
this Article does not challenge the federal government’s authority to 
enforce immigration and border security laws. Rather, it identifies 
limits on what the government can do while enforcing those laws, 
particularly when it comes to infringing on the rights of migrant 
children and families, as discussed further below. 
B. Potential Limits on the Use of Pretextual National Security 
Justifications for Family Separation and Detention 
In carrying out what are legitimate immigration and border 
security enforcement authorities, the Administration has claimed 
that its recent, more severe, activities are justified on national 
security grounds. The Executive has a constitutional responsibility to 
protect national security, and certain inherent powers to implement 
that responsibility. Courts often defer to the executive branch when it 
asserts national security justifications for laws and policies. If the 
executive branch begins to abuse that deference, however, courts may 
begin to look behind the proffered justifications for executive branch 
activities. Such review may have long-term consequences for the 
executive’s ability to act with flexibility in a true national security 
emergency. 
In one recent immigration-related policy decision, the 
Supreme Court addressed whether the President could unilaterally 
                                                                                                             
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. at 922–24 (“The simple principle that the Constitution vests the 
national government with certain fundamental indicia of national sovereignty, 
including the control of foreign policy and foreign affairs and the administration of 
immigration, has long been beyond dispute in our constitutional jurisprudence.”). 
64.  United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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limit immigration from certain (primarily Muslim) countries.65 The 
Court considered the President’s proclamation limiting entry from 
certain countries identified through an interagency process as posing 
threats to national security.66 The Court found that issuing the 
proclamation was within the authority granted to the president by 
Section 212(f) of the INA.67 Regulating immigration, the Court 
observed, resides in the “core of executive responsibility.”68 The Court 
acknowledged that the judiciary must be restrained when examining 
motivations behind executive national security actions, while opening 
the door to doing so. However, under the particular circumstances, it 
was persuaded that the proclamation was based on “legitimate 
national security interests.”69 In a 2019 case not involving national 
security but concerning an administrative determination by the 
executive branch involving the administration of the census, the 
Court looked behind the agency head’s stated reason for 
implementing a new regulation. Historically, the Court would not 
have considered the agency head’s motivation in such a core 
administrative function, but, in this case, the facts indicated that the 
Commerce Secretary had given pretextual reasons for adding a 
question to the census.70 The Court’s willingness to look behind the 
administrative decision may portend judicial review of the reasoning 
behind government policies in other contexts, such as national 
security. 
More specifically, future judicial consideration of executive 
branch assertions of national security justifications for large-scale 
detentions or detentions with open-ended time frames should take 
into account historical reasons to proceed cautiously. In 2018, the 
Supreme Court took the opportunity in Trump v. Hawaii to make 
                                                                                                             
65.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018) (reviewing whether the 
president had authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act to issue a 
proclamation limiting entry from certain countries, and whether the proclamation 
violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution). 
66.  Proclamation No. 9645, Fed. Reg. 37,635 (Sept. 24, 2017) (the 
proclamation focused on countries the administration claimed “remain deficient at 
this time with respect to their identity-management and information-sharing 
capabilities, protocols, and practices.”). 
67.  Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2415. 
68.  Id. at 2418. 
69.  Id. at 2422. 
70.  Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019) 
(“Altogether, the evidence tells a story that does not match the explanation the 
Secretary gave for his decision.”). 
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clear that Korematsu71—the 1944 case upholding Japanese-American 
internment during WWII—has no place in the law.72 Separately, in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a national security case involving the detention 
of an enemy combatant following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Court 
held that a U.S. citizen detained as an enemy combatant had a right 
to contest the basis of his detention.73 The circumstances of current 
family separation and children’s detention are obviously different 
from the facts in Hamdi,74 but there are lessons to be drawn from 
that case as it relates to detention. In Hamdi, the Court warned of an 
“unchecked system of detention,”75 cautioning that “[i]t is during our 
most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s 
commitment to due process is most severely tested . . . .”76 
Nevertheless, the Court in Hamdi understood Congress’s 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) to authorize 
detaining enemy combatants. In the family separation context, in 
contrast, there is no explicit legislative authorization to separate 
children from their families as a routine matter in order to deter 
others from crossing the border. And, even though AUMF 
affirmatively authorized the detention at issue in Hamdi, the Court 
nonetheless rejected circumstances that might become “indefinite” 
detention.77 
Although there may be individualized circumstances 
pertaining to specific persons, as a group, migrants arriving from 
Central America are not a recognized severe national security threat 
                                                                                                             
71.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). 
72.  Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (“Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent 
may see in doing so, Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible 
relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the 
basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential 
authority.”). 
73.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004). 
74.  It must be noted that Hamdi’s facts differ from our circumstances. In 
Hamdi, the petitioner was a U.S. citizen. However, in the circumstances we 
review in this Article, the detained individuals are non-U.S. citizens without 
lawful status in the United States. Further, in Hamdi, the petitioner had been 
designated through an administrative process as an enemy combatant. In our 
circumstances, although some detained children were actually unaccompanied, 
thousands have been separated from their families because the government 
initiated criminal prosecution proceedings as a result of its zero tolerance policy, 
without any individualized determination. 
75.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530. 
76.  Id. at 532. 
77.  Id. at 519–20. 
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or otherwise urgent public safety threat.78 The government cannot 
legitimately invoke these concerns as a legal basis for the family 
separation policy. This Administration risks undermining the 
executive’s prerogatives in the national security context by using 
pretextual national security justifications for policies that are 
actually based on political, not national security, imperatives. 
C. Constitutional Rights of Families 
Although family law issues might seem far removed from law 
governing detention, the family separation policy implicates both. 
Prior to recent litigation over family separation, family law’s 
development over several decades has at times emphasized the rights 
of parents, and at other times focused more heavily on the rights of 
children. In Judge Sabraw’s opinion preliminarily enjoining the 
family separation policy, he focused on the rights of families.79 As 
described in Part III, infra, the case of Ms. L. focuses on family 
members’ Fifth Amendment rights to family integrity as part of the 
guarantee of liberty. 
In modern U.S. legal history, parental rights have been more 
strongly developed than children’s rights; but in considering family 
separation as a punitive instrument of immigration policy and 
enforcement, the liberty rights of the child are also compelling. First, 
                                                                                                             
78.  Neither the 2018 nor the 2019 Worldwide Threat Briefing presented by 
the Director of National Intelligence to Congress identified Central American 
migration as one of the country’s most pressing national security threats. See 
Statement of Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ 
Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4SGC-ZCJJ] (discussing Central American migration as a trend but not 
identifying it as a pressing national security threat to the U.S.); Statement of 
Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community 
(Jan. 29, 2019) , https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---
SSCI.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XL3-JTAJ] (discussing Central American migration 
as a continued challenge to U.S. interests but not identifying it as a pressing 
national security threat to the U.S.). In addition, independent studies regarding 
public safety threats of immigrants question the existence of a correlation 
between undocumented immigrants and increased crime. Anna Flagg, Is There a 
Connection Between Undocumented Immigrants and Crime?, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/upshot/illegal-immigration-crime-
rates-research.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
79.  Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 
1162 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (citing the “liberty interest” of parents’ rights to “care, 
custody and control” of their children); see also Troxel v. Granville, infra note 81 
(same). 
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we consider the question of whether parents have a right not to have 
their children taken away by the government.80 A government and 
society that values the role of parents in guiding the development of 
their children cannot adhere to that value while disrupting or even 
severing the caregiving relationship between migrant parent and 
child. As Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority in Troxel v. 
Granville, “the liberty interest . . . of parents in the care, custody, and 
control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests recognized by this Court.” 81 
Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the “care, 
custody, and management of their child.”82 It is generally at the state 
and local level that a child may be taken from a parent’s custody—for 
example, as a result of a parent charged with a crime and detained as 
a result of the charge; as a result of criminal conviction; and, in the 
civil context, as a result of a custody determination in the instance of 
abuse or other family law proceeding resulting in the loss of custody 
of a child. The state has a responsibility to step in when parents are 
unfit or unable to care for a child.83 The legal system distinguishes 
between the loss of custody of a child and loss of parental rights. 
Parental rights are not absolute, but the state must meet a high 
standard—such as evidence of abuse or neglect—to terminate 
parental rights and step in as parens patriae.84 
Former Trump Administration Secretary of Homeland 
Security Kirstjen Nielsen argued that the practice of family 
                                                                                                             
80.  But see Jeffrey Shulman, Does the Constitution Protect a Fundamental 
Right to Parent?, CONSTITUTION DAILY (July 8, 2014), https://constitution 
center.org/blog/does-the-constitution-protect-a-fundamental-right-to-parent 
[https://perma.cc/39MT-8NBF] (“[N]o Supreme Court case has held that the right 
of parents to make . . . choices [for a child] is a fundamental one.”). 
81.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (affirming the Washington 
Supreme Court’s decision that the federal constitution “permits a state to 
interfere with the right of parents to rear their children only to prevent harm or 
potential harm to a child.”); see also Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional 
Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (2011) (“Since the early 1920s, parents have 
enjoyed broad constitutional rights to the care and custody of their children.”). 
82.  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
83.  See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (concerning the pretrial 
detention of a juvenile accused of serious crimes). 
84.  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748 (1982) (setting a high standard of “clear and 
convincing evidence” before a state can sever parental rights). Moreover, the 
government does not have unlimited power to step in and make decisions for a 
child instead of a parent. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 44 (1967) (“‘[T]he admonition 
to function in a “parental relationship” is not an invitation to procedural 
arbitrariness.’”) (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966)). 
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separation was consistent with the situation when a parent or 
guardian is arrested or convicted and detained in the criminal justice 
system.85 The situations are not, however, analogous. Individuals 
arrested or convicted have been provided due process, either through 
an arrest warrant based on probable cause issued by a judge, or a 
judgment by a judge or jury. Moreover, the children of detained or 
convicted adults who are subject to the criminal justice system are 
not denied their own liberty, whether present or anticipatory, as long 
as another caregiver is available.86 In the circumstance of family 
separation, prosecution automatically resulted in government custody 
of children because migrant children were separated from 
accompanying adults in a foreign country, often without adequate 
identifying information, making placement with an alternative family 
caregiver difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, the government did 
not take adequate steps to facilitate reunification of separated 
children and families once the parent’s improper entry violation was 
processed. 
There are also strong arguments that the child’s liberty rights 
are infringed by the practice of family separation.87 For over eighty 
years, the Supreme Court has recognized that all persons, including 
those who are “young, ignorant, illiterate, [and/or] surrounded by a 
                                                                                                             
85.  White House Daily Press Briefing, Remarks of Kirstjen Nielsen (June 
18, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?447252-1/homeland-security-secretary-
nielsen-calls-congress-fix-immigration-policy [https://perma.cc/CJ5G-585M] (“If an 
American were to commit a crime anywhere in the United States, they would go 
to jail and they would be separated from their family. This is not a controversial 
idea.”). 
86.  There are circumstances when children of an arrested adult may be 
taken into state custody pending placement with a relative or suitable guardian, 
or when children of a convicted adult may be placed into government custody or 
foster care following a best interests adjudication. But these processes are 
articulated in state law and policy and are conducted on a case-by-case basis. 
Children’s custody as a result of criminal prosecution of an adult is not a blanket 
government policy to deter crime, nor is it a permissible additional punishment 
with respect to the prosecuted adult. 
87.  So far, assertions of children’s rights to prevent the deportation of 
parents who have been convicted of crimes have not been successful at the circuit 
court level. See Payne-Barahona v. Gonzalez, 474 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007). That 
situation is distinguishable from the border separation situation, however, 
because in that case, due process was provided to the adult, who had been 
convicted of a felony, and a deportation order was issued. In the circumstance of 
separation at the border, legitimate asylum claims have not yet been adjudicated. 
And, with respect to children’s indefinite government detention, the children have 
done nothing wrong. 
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hostile sentiment,” are entitled to constitutional due process.88 
Children cannot be denied due process or “deprived arbitrarily of life 
or liberty.”89 For younger children, the right to due process may be 
assessed in terms of their right to a caregiving relationship and 
caregiving interests.90 For older children—an area in which there has 
been more judicial consideration—courts have considered the due 
process they are entitled to in the context of juvenile justice.91 In 
1967, the Supreme Court in In re Gault recognized the potentially 
harmful consequences of government detention on a child. No matter 
the “euphemism” used for the place of detention, 
an institution of confinement in which the child is 
incarcerated for a greater or lesser time . . . [can 
result in] his world becom[ing] ‘a building with 
whitewashed walls, regimented routine and 
institutional hours . . . [i]nstead of mother and father 
and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, 
his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state 
employees . . . .92 
Thus, over fifty years ago, the Court understood the gravity of 
placing a child in government institutions, and the constitutional 
necessity of providing that child with due process before taking that 
life-altering, drastic step. Genuine due process must be afforded to 
children.93 If minors accused of crimes are entitled to due process to 
ensure they are not unjustly detained, then minors who have 
committed no crime themselves, and were brought to the United 
                                                                                                             
88.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1932) (the infamous Scottsboro 
Boys case wherein the Supreme Court held that the youths were entitled to 
counsel in the capital case against them). 
89.  Dailey, supra note 81, at 2100. 
90.  See id. at 2104 (articulating an argument that children have a 
fundamental constitutional right in the caregiving relationship). An adoption of 
Dailey’s argument would lead to the assessment that due process protects 
children from “state intervention into established caregiving relationships” which 
would be relevant to the practice of detaining children separately from parents for 
an indefinite amount of time following separation at the border. Further, Dailey 
articulates an argument that children may have “affirmative constitutional rights 
to a minimum level of caregiving services from the state”, which would be relevant 
to the allegations of inadequate safe and sanitary conditions that were revealed 
through media reports in 2019. Id. 
91.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967) (noting that juveniles are entitled to 
due process). 
92.  Id. at 27. 
93.  Id. at 28 (“Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not 
justify a kangaroo court.”). 
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States by an adult, are entitled to due process94 before they are 
separated from their parent or caregiver and indefinitely detained by 
the government, both acts that infringe on their liberty. 
In addition to a right to due process, children also arguably 
have anticipatory rights to future liberty. The idea of anticipatory 
rights pertains to protecting rights for children to exercise once they 
are fully developed and capable of exercising them; it is, in essence, 
protecting their future exercise of their rights, in trust.95 Numerous 
pediatric experts have explained how the separation from the parent 
at the border and subsequent detention of children in government 
facilities may cause long-term damage, especially to young children. 
The American Academy of Pediatrics has warned that detained 
children face negative physical and emotional consequences.96 
Unexpected separation from a parent and indefinite detention may 
cause lasting damage to children’s development. Using an 
anticipatory rights framework suggests that denial of liberty at young 
ages can cause long-term damage to children’s development later.97 
Thus, the government policy of separation and detention not only 
infringes on the child’s immediate liberty but also on that child’s 
future development, which can affect the grown child’s full exercise of 
his or her liberty. 
Apart from limitations on separating parents from children, 
there are also limits on the practice of holding hearings regarding 
children without their parent or guardian present.98 Due process for 
                                                                                                             
94.  Consider what this would look like: what is an acceptable due process 
or adjudication process for children at the border? At least, the law could mandate 
reasonable efforts by government officials to promptly: identify if the person they 
arrived with is a parent, contact a parent or family member in the United States, 
and place the child with the parent for a period of time. 
95.  Dailey, supra note 81, at 2144. 
96.  Julie M. Linton et al., Detention of Immigrant Children, PEDIATRICS, 
Apr. 2017, 1, at 6, https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/139/5/ 
e20170483.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB8K-SKZF]. 
97.  Laurence D. Houlgate, Three Concepts of Children’s Constitutional 
Rights: Reflections on the Enjoyment Theory, U. PA. J. CONST. L. 77, 86–88 (1999) 
(articulating a theory of anticipatory rights as a right-in-trust, “younger children 
are persons in the sense that they have the right to be provided with 
opportunities and conditions assuring the full enjoyment of their constitutional 
rights when they acquire the characteristics of adult persons.”). 
98.  See Christina Jewett & Shefali Luthra, Immigrant Toddlers Ordered to 
Appear in Court Alone, TEX. TRIB. (June 27, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/ 
2018/06/27/immigrant-toddlers-ordered-appear-court-alone/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5CGL-ELJG]. 
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children99 must take into account that they are generally not 
recognized as capable of making important decisions for 
themselves.100 This is particularly true of young children. Thus, the 
government’s practice of holding hearings adjudicating the rights and 
status of children without their parent or guardian present should be 
impermissible, unless the government has taken meaningful steps to 
locate the parent or adult with a substantial relationship with the 
child. 
Whether our analysis rests more on the children’s rights 
framework which developed in the 1970s, or the parent’s rights 
framework that evolved in the 1980s, the consequence of applying 
either framework is that children may not be detained apart from 
their parent absent an individualized assessment that this is in the 
child’s best interest. No such assessment appears to have been 
implemented to precede the government’s separation and detention of 
children affected by the family separation policy. 
D. Constitutional Rights of Non-U.S. Persons Inside the United 
States 
Separate from considering the rights of families, an analysis 
of the rights of migrant families must take into account that the 
Constitution protects non-citizens. In short, all persons present on 
U.S. territory have constitutional rights. The moment a non-U.S. 
citizen enters the United States, that person has certain basic 
constitutional rights by virtue of his or her territorial presence.101 
The development of constitutional law involving non-U.S. 
persons has often involved the Fourth Amendment.102 The Supreme 
                                                                                                             
99.  Migrant children are particularly vulnerable: they are likely at a 
language disadvantage in the United States and may have been already subject to 
traumatic experiences in their home country or in transit to the U.S. border. For 
those reasons, the government should be under an enhanced obligation to ensure 
that the law and policies that apply to consideration of their cases and their 
physical and emotional care be highly regulated and implemented with care. The 
law should protect the most vulnerable. 
100.  See Dailey, supra note 81, at 2131, 2133–34. 
101.  This was, of course, an underlying reason for detaining 9/11-era 
terrorist detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and not in the territorial United 
States. See Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 55, 78 
(2011). 
102.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 
(1984) (recognizing respect for legal rights as a longstanding understanding in 
immigration enforcement). The Fourth Amendment does not apply to foreign 
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Court has articulated distinctions between the application of 
constitutional protections based on nationality (U.S. citizen or 
national, or not) and location (inside the United States or a territory 
subject to U.S. de facto sovereignty, or not). Although case law 
currently gives CBP broad search and seizure authority at the border 
and within a 100-mile border zone inside the territorial United 
States, that does not mean that constitutional rights do not apply to 
individuals within the territory. Rather, the balancing tests used to 
determine when invasions of privacy (for example) are consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment take into consideration the context of 
border enforcement, resulting in less robust protections. 
While Fourth Amendment case law provides substantial 
examples of protecting rights of non-U.S. persons at and near the 
border, aliens also “have a wide range of rights under the 
Constitution,” including (but not limited to) First, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights.103 The most relevant rights at 
issue for family separation are Fifth Amendment due process rights. 
Migrant children and families detained by the U.S. government are 
entitled to some base level of due process before they are separated. 
The U.S. government may not keep children in sustained government 
custody absent due process. This entitlement to due process 
constrains the government’s actions even before the underling 
adjudication of the entrants’ immigration or asylum claim. In 
Zadvydas v. Davis, for example, the Supreme Court considered a non-
U.S. citizen’s challenge to detention that stretched beyond ninety 
days.104 Although the Supreme Court recently declined to read into 
                                                                                                             
persons in foreign lands, when that individual has no substantial connection to 
the United States. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 
(1990); cf. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (resident alien is 
a “person” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment); Wong Wing v. United 
States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (resident aliens entitled to Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (Fourteenth 
Amendment protects resident aliens). 
103.  Ilya Somin, The Constitutional Rights of Noncitizens, LEARN LIBERTY 
(Apr. 30, 2017), https://www.learnliberty.org/blog/t-he-constitutional-rights-of-
noncitizens/ [https://perma.cc/XZM5-PEGF] (arguing against the claim that 
noncitizens in the immigration context are not afforded constitutional rights); see 
also Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The 
Plenary Power Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 
13, 15–17 (2003) (discussing the Chinese exclusion cases and the impact of the 
“plenary power” doctrine on immigration law). 
104.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). The decision only concerned 
detention of aliens who had previously been admitted to the U.S. and later 
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the INA a six-month limit on immigration detention without bond,105 
the Zadvydas court recognized that indefinite detention merits severe 
constitutional inquiry: 
[I]ndefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious 
constitutional problem. The Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause forbids the government to “depriv[e] 
any person . . . of . . . liberty . . . without due process of 
law.” Freedom from imprisonment—from government 
custody, detention, or other forms of physical 
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause 
protects.106 
Once an alien is inside the United States, at the very least, 
due process applies.107 This applies even once individuals are in 
facilities operated near the border by DHS. 
The punitive nature of migrant family separation further 
suggests its unconstitutionality.108 The Trump Administration’s 
family separation policy was punitive.109 For over 120 years it has 
been settled law that the government may not inflict a harsh 
punishment on an alien in conjunction with removal proceedings. In 
Wong Wing v. United States, the Court considered whether an alien 
ordered removed could be subject to a year of hard labor. The 
question before the Court was whether, in the course of implementing 
a government policy geared toward controlling illegal immigration, 
the punitive measure of hard physical labor could be applied. The 
Court rejected such punishment, whether of hard labor or of 
                                                                                                             
ordered removed; it did not consider detention circumstances for individuals who 
had not yet been granted lawful admission to the U.S. 
105.  Rodriguez v. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830, 845–46 (2018). 
106.  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 
107.  Id. at 693 (“[O]nce an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance 
changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United 
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, 
temporary or permanent.”). 
108.  Id. at 692 (holding that the government may not detain aliens ordered 
deported indefinitely: “the serious constitutional problem arising out of a statute 
that, in these circumstances, permits an indefinite, perhaps permanent, 
deprivation of human liberty without any such protection is obvious.”). 
109.  The authors are not alone in characterizing the intent of the family 
separation policy as punitive. The American Bar Association’s Commission on 
Immigration published an extensive memo characterizing it as such. See 
Background on Separation of Families and Prosecution of Migrants at the 
Southwest Border, AMER. B. ASSOC. (July 31, 2018), https://www.americanbar. 
org/groups/public_interest/immigration/resources/memo-on-family-separation/ 
[https://perma.cc/HK4Y-CWPU]. 
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confiscation of property.110 Thus, even if an alien is found guilty of the 
crime of illegal entry, a punitive act by the government is not 
permitted. Certainly, separating parent from child is more punitive 
than confiscation of property, both for the parent and the child. 
Separation of a child from a parent causes “irreparable harm”111 and 
amounts to the punitive conduct prohibited by Wong Wing. 
III. THE REACH OF DOMESTIC U.S. LAW FOR DEALING WITH 
WRONGFUL FAMILY SEPARATION IN THE IMMIGRATION SETTING 
As outlined in Part I, the Trump Administration separated 
thousands of children and parents, acting with extreme hostility and 
subjecting both children and parents to harsh, frightening, and 
sometimes unsafe conditions. Vigorous application of existing 
domestic law can and must be used to stop family separations, to 
deter their reoccurrence, to reunify separated families, and to 
compensate both children and adults for the serious harms suffered. 
This section discusses how U.S. domestic civil law can advance these 
goals, though we also posit that a legislatively-created program might 
achieve them more expeditiously than sole reliance on existing law. 
Congress could take action to enhance and build upon other pre-
existing domestic legal avenues to end family separation, a matter we 
turn to in the conclusion of this Article. 
Injunctive relief has been the most immediate tool for halting 
the government’s unlawful family separation practices. The American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and other groups have brought suits 
seeking a variety of judicial prohibitions and declarations meant to 
end family separation and reunify those wrongfully parted from one 
another. Resting on constitutional grounds, courts have declared the 
Trump family separations unlawful. Despite this, individual claims 
rooted in constitutional rights are unlikely to yield recovery for 
damages inflicted on parents and children. Common law tort claims 
afford the best chance at corrective justice for individual parents and 
children, with the government paying money damages to those 
injured by its policy and practice of family separation. We argue here 
that plaintiffs would be very likely to succeed on such claims and 
might realize large jury awards. 
                                                                                                             
110.  Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237–38 (noting that due 
process provisions of the Constitution “are universal in their application to all 
persons . . . without regard to any differences of race, of color, or nationality”). 
111.  See Leiva Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 969–70 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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A. Class Action Seeking Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Based 
on Constitutional and Statutory Law 
Attention to the Trump Administration’s combination of zero 
tolerance and family separation as a deterrent to lawful immigration 
spiked in June 2018.112 As noted above, on June 6, 2018, in Ms. L. v. 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter Ms. L. v. 
ICE), Judge Dana Sabraw of the Southern District of California 
recognized the validity of a constitutional claim against the U.S. 
government brought by the ACLU on behalf of separated parents.113 
Later that month, Judge Sabraw certified a class action to litigate 
whether the Trump Administration had violated the substantive due 
process right of class members to family integrity. The court next 
granted plaintiffs’ motions for class certification and for a preliminary 
injunction, and ordered reunification of the children in custody of the 
Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) with their parents within thirty 
days.114 Rather than litigate these matters to a conclusion, the U.S. 
government entered into a negotiated working agreement under the 
court’s supervision to implement the relief ordered by the court.115 
Defendants in Ms. L. v. ICE include all the federal agencies 
involved in setting and implementing the policies that caused 
immigrant families to be separated as well as a range of specific 
people, who, acting in their official capacities, set and operationalized 
these policies.116 
                                                                                                             
112.  See Aaron Hegarty, Timeline: Immigrant Children Separated From 
Families at the Border, USA TODAY (June 27, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/2018/06/27/immigrant-children-family-separation-border-
timeline/734014002/ [https://perma.cc/4V2K-TVU7]. 
113.  Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 302 F.Supp.3d 1149, 
1168 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (dismissing claims premised on the Administrative 
Procedure Act and various immigration and asylum statutes while allowing the 
constitutional claim to proceed). 
114.  As explained in Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 330 
F.R.D. 284, 286 (S.D. Cal. 2019). 
115.  Pending Agreement, Part 2, Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enf’t, No. 3:18-cv-00428 (S.D. Cal. 2018), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/ms-
l-v-ice-pending-agreement-part-2 [https://perma.cc/LQ2V-TSJU]. 
116.  Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 330 F.R.D. 284 (S.D. Cal. 
2019). Defendants included, in addition to ICE, the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), the then-Acting Director of ICE, a 
number of ICE Field Office Directors in San Diego and El Paso, the then-
Secretary of DHS, the then-Attorney General of the United States, the Director of 
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The Ms. L. v. ICE plaintiffs originally sought a wider range of 
declaratory and injunctive relief than is currently being implemented. 
The complaint requested a pronouncement from the court that 
Trump-era family separation was illegal, and sought a prohibition of 
any further family separation. The court granted both these 
measures. But the court’s current injunction does not extend to other 
steps originally requested in the complaint, such as that the U.S. 
government either release parents and their children from detention 
together or hold detained families together in the same facility; that 
the U.S. refrain from deporting otherwise removable parents from the 
U.S. until they are united with their children or the parents 
knowingly and voluntarily have decided they do not want their 
children removed with them; and that the U.S. discontinue further 
removals of parents until class members have had an opportunity to 
confer with legal counsel and a reasonable opportunity to pursue 
asylum. 
The court also ultimately defined the class covered by its 
orders somewhat differently from the group specified in the ACLU’s 
original request for class certification.117 Originally, the only parents 
included were those who had entered the U.S. and were continuously 
present in the U.S. from June 26, 2018 onward.118 Later, when it 
became apparent that the government had adopted its family 
separation tactics earlier than that date, the court amended the class 
to include parents who had arrived earlier and been separated from 
their children.119  
To comply with the court’s orders, the government agreed to 
make concrete reunification efforts and to spell out avenues to asylum 
hearings for parents. Efforts to implement all of these measures are 
ongoing, taking place under Judge Sabraw’s supervision of the case. 
Meanwhile, the ACLU continues to pursue relief for two 
classes related to the one certified in Ms. L. v. ICE. In Padilla v. U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter Padilla v. 
ICE),120 the court certified a “credible fear interview class” and a 
                                                                                                             
USCIS, the then-Acting Commissioner of CBP, CBP Field Directors in San Diego 
and El Paso, the then-Secretary of HHS, and the then-Director of ORR. 
117.  Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, No. 3:18-cv-00428, 2018 
WL 3155677 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018). 
118.  Id. at 287. 
119.  Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 330 F.R.D. 284, 287 (S.D. 
Cal. 2019). 
120.  Order Granting Class Certification, Padilla v. U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enf’t, No. 2:18-cv-00928 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2019), https://american 
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“bond hearing class.” Both classes seek injunctive relief for adult 
asylum seekers, including parents who were separated from their 
children by ICE. The relief sought relates to the amount of time the 
government can hold asylum seekers in detention without, first, 
making a determination of whether the putative asylee has a credible 
fear of persecution or torture if she or he returns to her or his home 
country and, second, without holding a bond hearing for asylees 
recognized as having credible fear. With regard to the “bond hearing 
class,” the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington 
granted, in July 2019, a temporary injunction enjoining the 
government from refusing bond hearings for asylum seekers who 
have passed credible fear interviews and requiring a bond hearing to 
be held within seven days of a determination that an asylum seeker 
has credible fear of persecution if she or he returns home.121 Thus, 
this injunction would prevent a parent in this class from remaining 
separated from his or her child by virtue of being denied a bond 
hearing. The government is resisting this result by litigating the 
preliminary injunction issued by the District Court as well as by 
pursuing the case on its merits.122 In short, the government is seeking 
to extend some family separations by trying to make parole 
impossible for asylum-seeking parents who have established credible 
fear. Without parole, these parents cannot reunite with their 
children. 
Whether various injunctions will successfully reunify 
separated families, result in lawful treatment of children and parents 
seeking asylum, and deter the government from committing 
                                                                                                             
immigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/litigation_documents/challenging_credib
le_fear_interview_and_bond_hearing_delays_order_for_class_certification.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4SQG-738M]; see also Federal Court Requires Immigration 
Courts to Continue to Provide Bond Hearings Despite Matter of M-S, AM. IMMIGR. 
COUNCIL (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/ 
sites/default/files/practice_advisory/federal_court_requires_immigration_courts_to
_continue_to_provide_bond_hearings_despite_matter_of_m-s-.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RAA-L5S8] (explaining the impact of the Padilla decision). 
121.  Order on the Motions re: Preliminary Injunction, Padilla v. U.S. 




122.  Challenging Credible Fear Interview and Bond Hearing Delays, AM. 
IMMIGR. COUNCIL, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/litigation/ 
challenging-credible-fear-interview-and-bond-hearing-delays [https://perma.cc/ 
S4NK-ZKZK]. 
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additional unconstitutional acts of family separation in the 
immigration setting remains to be seen.123 
B. Individual Constitutional Tort Claims: Bivens Actions 
The central constitutional claim successfully asserted so far 
by migrants who have suffered family separation is that the Trump 
Administration’s policy and practice violated their constitutionally 
guaranteed right to family integrity. As discussed in Part II, the right 
to family integrity derives from the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of 
liberty, with familial association long recognized as an integral 
component of natural persons’ right to be free from governmental 
interference. Prospective immigrants enjoy a substantive due process 
right to family integrity.124 When a federal government official 
invades this right and causes personal injury, a victim has, in 
principle, a cause of action to recover compensatory and punitive 
damages because of the availability of so-called Bivens actions.125 
Bivens actions are a judicially created remedy against federal officers 
acting under color of law who violate individuals’ federally 
guaranteed rights and thereby harm them. Bivens is a federal 
counterpart to Section 1983 constitutional tort claims against state 
officers acting under color of state law. Named after the U.S. Code 
                                                                                                             
123.  The ACLU has repeatedly had to return to court to ensure Trump 
Administration compliance with the working agreement. See, e.g., Memo in 
Support of Motion to Enforce Preliminary Injunction, Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration 
& Customs Enf’t, No. 3:18-cv-00428, 330 F.R.D. 284 (S.D. Cal. 2019), 
https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/ms-l-v-ice-memo-support-motion-enforce-pi 
[https://perma.cc/B3XY-66AA]. In addition, on October 3, 2019, the ACLU filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona to be a class 
representative in a damages action on behalf of separated families and seeking 
the creation of a victim compensation fund. See Zoe Tillman (@ZoeTillman), 
TWITTER (Oct. 3, 2019, 10:07 AM), https://twitter.com/ZoeTillman/status/ 
1179805180059176961 [https://perma.cc/9AD3-GXCE]. 
124.  “A parent has a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in companionship with 
his or her child.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(citation omitted); see also Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 330 
F.R.D. 284, 286 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (“Plaintiffs challenged this family separation 
policy as a violation of their substantive due process rights to family integrity 
under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [T]his 
Court . . . ordered reunification of the children in ORR custody with their parents 
within 30 days.”). 
125.  Named for Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that a violation of Fourth Amendment 
rights by federal officers can give rise to a federal cause of action for damages for 
unlawful searches and seizures). 
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provision that delineates the cause of action, 1983 claims permit 
recovery of monetary damages.126 Both Bivens actions and Section 
1983 actions have been structured and inflected by a large body of 
Supreme Court precedent. With regard to Bivens actions in 
particular, this precedent has sharply limited the effective reach of 
individual damage actions against federal officers who inflict harm by 
violation of a constitutional right.127 So, even in the circumstances 
acknowledged in the Ms. L. v. ICE agreement, immigrant parents and 
children face an uphill battle to recover for their injuries arising from 
federal officials violating their constitutionally protected right to 
family integrity.128 
The Supreme Court case creating Bivens actions was decided 
in 1971, with the Court holding that individuals may have a judicial 
remedy—including monetary damages—for harms arising from the 
conduct of federal agents when such agents are acting under color of 
federal authority.129 Bivens itself involved a Fourth Amendment 
violation by drug enforcement agents. After Bivens, the Supreme 
Court permitted recovery against federal agents for conduct violating 
the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the 
                                                                                                             
126.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). The statute reads, in its entirety: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action 
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in 
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be 
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory 
relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act 
of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia 
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
Id. With the phrase “liable to the party injured in an action at law,” Section 1983 
creates a cause of action for money damages. 
127.  See infra notes 131–134 and accompanying text. 
128.  See Alvarez v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 818 F.3d 1194, 1208 
(11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Immigration and Nationality Act was an 
“elaborate remedial system” precluding a Bivens claim but noting that Bivens 
actions might be available for claims regarding physical abuse or punitive 
conditions) (internal citations omitted). 
129.  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388. 
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law.130 The Court has also permitted Bivens recovery in a suit where 
federal prison officials failed to provide an inmate with proper 
medical care, thereby violating his Eighth Amendment right to be 
free from cruel and unusual punishment.131 However, since these 
cases were decided, the Supreme Court has become resistant to 
Bivens actions. 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Ziglar v. Abbasi,132 a case that raised serious questions about the 
viability of Bivens actions against high ranking officials in 
immigration settings.133 In Ziglar, the Supreme Court announced that 
it would not recognize Bivens actions in “new contexts,” a term the 
Court defined very broadly.134 The Ziglar court also emphasized a set 
                                                                                                             
130.  See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979) (recognizing a 
Bivens claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
when a Congressman fired an administrative assistant based on her gender). 
131.  See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16–18 (1980). 
132.  Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). The Ziglar plaintiffs were 
non-citizens of Arab descent (or perceived Arab descent) who had been picked up 
and detained without bail in the aftermath of 9/11. During their imprisonment at 
the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), MDC employees subjected the 
plaintiffs to harsh and oppressive conditions and physical abuse. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1853 (“According to the complaint, prison guards engaged in a pattern of 
‘physical and verbal abuse.’ Guards allegedly slammed detainees into walls; 
twisted their arms, wrists, and fingers; broke their bones; referred to them as 
terrorists; threatened them with violence; subjected them to humiliating sexual 
comments; and insulted their religion.”). 
133.  Federal appellate courts have also displayed hostility to Bivens actions 
in the immigration context. See De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 374 (5th Cir. 
2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) (refusing to recognize Bivens remedies 
in consolidated appeals for alleged Fourth Amendment violations, holding that 
“civil immigration proceedings” constitute a new context for Bivens claims); 
Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to 
recognize a Bivens remedy against immigration officers for “unlawful detention [of 
noncitizens] during deportation proceedings.”). 
134.  In Ziglar, the Supreme Court held that the situation was too different 
from prior cases permitting Bivens recovery to allow the Ziglar plaintiffs to 
proceed against “executive officials” or even the prison warden himself. The Court 
explained: 
The proper test for determining whether a case presents a new 
Bivens context is as follows. If the case is different in a 
meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this 
Court, then the context is new. Without endeavoring to create 
an exhaustive list of differences that are meaningful enough to 
make a given context a new one, some examples might prove 
instructive. A case might differ in a meaningful way because of 
the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at 
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of policy guidelines for lower courts to use to limit actions that meet 
the similarity criterion.135 There are, however, a few post-9/11 cases 
that leave some potential room for allowing Bivens actions in the 
immigration setting.136 A court might hold that the parent’s and 
child’s claims are sufficiently similar to cases in which Bivens actions 
have been allowed, and are sufficiently unrelated to the sort of policy 
concerns raised by the Supreme Court in Ziglar, to permit the action. 
Ziglar, however, provides numerous bases for courts to distinguish 
claims based on family separation from established Bivens actions. 
Whether Bivens actions brought by separated families would 
surmount today’s judicial skepticism toward Bivens remedies cannot 
be known in advance of litigation.137 In any event, given the 
availability of a tort remedy under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA), the victims of the recent government family separation policy 
and practice may not need to rely on Bivens-type claims to recover 
damages for the injuries they have suffered. 
C. Individual Tort Actions 
The ACLU sought only injunctive and declaratory relief on 
behalf of the class of immigrant parents separated from their children 
                                                                                                             
issue; the generality or specificity of the official action; the 
extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond 
to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or 
other legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the 
risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the 
functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential 
special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider. 
Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. 
135.  Id. at 1857–58. 
136.  See, e.g., Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 627 (5th Cir. 
2006) (denying qualified immunity defense to immigration officer where 
noncitizen alleged that immigration officer physically assaulted and arrested her 
without provocation); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(reversing dismissal of Bivens claims against immigration agents on behalf of 
noncitizen killed in detention); Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (“No remedy for the alleged constitutional violations would affect the 
BIA’s final order of removal. Any remedy available to Mr. Ballesteros would lie in 
a Bivens action.”). 
137.  See Carrie Cordero, Legal Considerations for Separating Families at 
the Border, LAWFARE (June 19, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-
considerations-separating-families-border [https://perma.cc/A85E-3WUK] 
(arguing that individual federal officials who engage in federal civil rights 
violations in the course of carrying out family separation or overseeing children’s 
detention may also be implicated in federal color of law violations). 
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because of the Trump Administration’s “zero tolerance” policies and 
the use of family separation to deter lawful immigration to the United 
States. This approach made sense as an early response to the 
combination of zero tolerance and family separation as an intentional 
damper on asylum-seeking and other lawful immigration to the U.S., 
but it cannot achieve corrective justice for the victims of these 
policies. Without requiring the government to compensate migrant 
parents and children injured by family separation, there may not be 
sufficient incentive for the government to fully disengage from such 
activity. Common law tort suits are the most likely avenue to achieve 
corrective justice for separated family members, thereby providing 
compensation and the government with a financial reason not to 
reintroduce the practice in any guise. 
In February 2019, six asylum-seeking mothers and children 
filed administrative claims with DHS and HHS for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA.138 As of late July 
2019, five more families have given notice of similar claims.139 The 
three most recent claimants are fathers separated from their 
children.140 They are seeking “$3 million in compensation per person, 
or a total of $6 million per separated family,” according to the 
Southern Poverty Law Center, which is representing the families.141 
If the government does not respond to the claims within six months, 
the fathers can sue the government in federal court.142 With at least 
four thousand children and their parents subjected to family 
separation, the aggregate liability for the harms suffered could reach 
up to $24 billion.143 
                                                                                                             
138.  Press Release, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Announcing Legal 
Claims Against Government on Behalf of Parents and Children Separated at the 
Border (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/news/2019/ 
02/arnold-porter-brings-legal-claims-against [https://perma.cc/7ENC-S9V8]. For 
specifics about individual claims, see Separated Family Members Seek Monetary 
Damages from United States, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, http://americanimmigration 
council.org/litigation/separated-family-members-seek-monetary-damages-united-
states [https://perma.cc/K4Y3-F6V3]). 
139.  See Family Separation, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/ 
our-issues/immigrant-justice/family-separation [https://perma.cc/M7ZZ-Z94Z]. 
140.  Madeline Holcombe, Their Children Cry at Night After Border 
Separation. These Fathers Are Seeking Damages for the Harm They Suffered, 
CNN (July 25, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/us/fathers-damages-border-
separation/index.html [https://perma.cc/9V37-7AFB]. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. 
143.  We calculated this very rough number using the amount claimed per 
family in the latest claims filed at the time of this writing and assuming a total of 
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Typically, sovereign immunity would insulate the federal 
government from tort liability. The FTCA, however, makes the 
federal government liable for torts it commits when it engages in 
conduct that would yield tort liability for a private person engaged in 
such conduct.144 The FTCA specifically authorizes the award of 
monetary damages to those injured by tortious conduct of the U.S. 
government and its employees. While some intentional torts are 
excepted from the FTCA, actions for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress are permitted.145 
The administrative-exhaustion requirement applicable to 
FTCA claims bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until 
                                                                                                             
four thousand affected families potentially able to make similar claims. Of course, 
each family’s experiences would create different amounts of damages, most likely 
some less and some more than three million dollars. We specify an aggregate 
number here to highlight the scale of the potential of the liability, not to prejudge 
the final amount that might be awarded after damage determinations at trial. 
144.  “In order for a suit to proceed against the United States, a waiver of 
sovereign immunity must exist.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 
475 (1994). The FTCA constitutes a partial waiver of the federal government's 
sovereign immunity, which permits a claimant to sue the United States for the 
“negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while 
acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2018); 
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 115 n.4 (1979). “[T]he FTCA makes the 
United States liable to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances, under the law of the place where the tort occurred, subject to 
enumerated exceptions to the immunity waiver.” Levin v. United States, 568 U.S. 
503, 507 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “If a tort claim 
against the United States falls into one of the FTCA’s exceptions it is barred by 
sovereign immunity.” Hernandez v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (D. 
Colo. 2014). 
145.  The United States can be liable for the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. It is not one of the intentional torts explicitly exempted by 28 
U.S.C. § 2680(h) from the general rule of liability, and the Court must assume in 
the absence of contrary legislative intent that the lists of exceptions in 28 U.S.C. 
2680(h) is comprehensive. Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am., 564 F.2d 531, 539 & 
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937, 945–46 (D. Conn. 
1977) (FTCA liability for invasion of privacy); see also Boger, Gitenstein & 
Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An 
Interpretative Analysis, 54 U.N.C. L. REV. 497, 519 (1976) (same); Crain v. 
Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp. 202, 211 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (“Inclusion of this intentional 
tort in the law enforcement proviso of § 2680(h) is therefore not necessary to 
create sovereign liability for this tort.”); Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79,  
91–93 (1st Cir. 2009) (U.S. government not entitled to tort immunity for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress on criminal defendants framed and 
imprisoned). 
2020] The Law Against Family Separation 471 
they have exhausted their administrative remedies.146 But after that, 
an unsatisfied claimant can litigate, and, if successful, win monetary 
damages. 
Federal courts apply relevant state tort law to tort claims 
against the U.S. government.147 Choice of law depends on the 
geographical locus of the allegedly tortious events. State law on 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the strongest tort claim 
separated families have, does not vary much. Whether families were 
separated in Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, California, or elsewhere in 
the United States, migrant families’ intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claims will be treated similarly.148 
The central idea behind this tort is distinctly moral. It is 
meant to provide a remedy to those “intentionally or recklessly” 
subjected to “extreme and outrageous conduct,”149 especially from 
those who hold power over them.150 The conduct must go beyond 
                                                                                                             
146.  28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2018); see Barnes v. United States, 776 F.3d 1134, 
1139 (10th Cir. 2015). 
147.  Pornomo v. United States, 814 F.3d 681, 687 (4th Cir. 2016) (“The 
FTCA does not create a new cause of action; rather, it permits the United States 
to be held liable in tort by providing a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.”); 
Raplee v. United States, 842 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2274 (2017) (explaining that “the FTCA merely waives sovereign immunity to 
make the United States amenable to a state tort suit”); Hornbeck Offshore 
Transp., LLC v. United States, 569 F.3d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“This statutory 
text does not create a cause of action against the United States; it allows the 
United States to be liable if a private party would be liable under similar 
circumstances in the relevant jurisdiction.”). 
148.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts was extremely influential upon all 
U.S. jurisdictions’ development of the law of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The drafters of the current Restatement (Third) of Torts found cases 
showing that forty-five jurisdictions, including D.C. and the Virgin Islands, 
expressly follow § 46; three states (Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee) follow a 
modified version; two states (Hawaii and Wisconsin) follow an earlier version; and 
two states (Mississippi and Montana) reject the Restatement approach altogether. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46, at 22–23 (Council Draft No. 6, 2006). 
149.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (AM. LAW. INST. 2012). Note that recklessness suffices to 
meet the scienter requirement for a successful claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. See id. cmt. h (“Courts uniformly hold that reckless conduct, 
not just intentional conduct, can support a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional harm.”). Note, too, that once conduct is found to be outrageous, that 
usually suffices to establish intent. See id. reporter’s note h. (“Extraordinarily 
rare are cases in which extreme and outrageous conduct was satisfied but the 
intent requirement was not.”). 
150.  See, e.g., Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So. 2d 406, 409–10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1990) (“[O]utrageousness is more likely to be found where some relationship 
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incivility or even ordinary malice. To prevail, a plaintiff must show 
that the conduct “has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme 
in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community.”151 “Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of 
the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his 
[or her] resentment against the actor and lead him [or her] to 
exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”152 To make out and win an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress action, plaintiffs must give detailed 
and substantial factual evidence to prove these elements, as well as 
the usual evidence on causation and damages required in any 
personal injury litigation. 
The facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ filings, and public reaction 
to news reporting on these facts, indicate that plaintiffs stand a good 
chance of recovering against the U.S. government and state and 
private actors involved in family separation. To make clear the 
strength of the potential intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims, we go into fine detail about one such claim below. The range 
and force of the facts alleged drive home our view that, if these facts 
are proven at trial, factfinders will conclude that “an average member 
of the community” presented with such information would cry, 
“Outrageous!” 
To illustrate, let us consider one administrative filing, 
presented on behalf of “A.P.F.” and his seven-year-old son, “O.P.D.”153 
The father and son fled Guatemala because of persecution of the 
father and the medical needs of the son, arriving in Arizona in mid-
                                                                                                             
exists that gives the defendant actual or apparent authority over another or 
power to affect his interests.”). 
151.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 1965); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 2012) (“Section 46 of the Second Restatement, 
on which this Section is based, employed the ‘extreme and outrageous conduct’ 
standard. That standard has been widely adopted, has been employed 
satisfactorily, and has become familiar. For these reasons, it is retained in this 
Section.”). 
152.  Id. 
153.  Notice of Claims from Matthew J. Schlesinger, Partner, Covington & 
Burling LLP to Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 4, 2019), 
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/apf_opd_cover_letter_sf95_att._a_-
_final_redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/67KX-995T]. The account given in this 
Article is drawn wholly from this source. 
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May 2018. Both are members of the indigenous Q’anjob’al tribe.154 
The family home in a remote region of Guatemala had been burned 
                                                                                                             
154.  The Q’anjob’al consider themselves descendants of the Mayans. Like 
all indigenous people in Guatemala they are among the country’s least well off, by 
any metric, including likelihood of being subjected to racist persecution. See Maria 
Martin, Killings Of Guatemala’s Indigenous Activists Raise Specter of Human 
Rights Crisis, NPR (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/22/685505116/ 
killings-of-guatemalas-indigenous-activists-raise-specter-of-human-rights-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/4CVF-AN3B]; Elizabeth Lowman, UN Special Rapporteur 
Expresses Concern over Guatemala’s Treatment of Indigenous Peoples, JURIST 
(May 11, 2018), https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/05/un-special-rapporteur-
expresses-concern-over-guatemalas-treatment-of-indigenous-peoples/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Z9PQ-XEFB]; Ellen Wulfhorst, Indigenous and Female: Life at the 
Bottom in Guatemala, REUTERS (May 3, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-guatemala-women-indigenous/indigenous-and-female-life-at-the-bottom-in-
guatemala-idUSKBN17Z07N [https://perma.cc/X8S8-ACCX]. 
Today’s subordination and persecution of Guatemalans of indigenous descent 
has deep roots. During the Guatemalan Civil War of the 1980s, the military 
targeted the indigenous civilian population, killing up to 200,000 people. 
COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION, GUATEMALA: MEMORY OF SILENCE: 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION: CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 17 (1999), https://hrdag.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/ 
CEHreport-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BHD-DL5T]. Eighty-three percent of 
the fully-identified victims were Mayan. Id; see also Mireya Navarro, Guatemalan 
Army Waged ‘Genocide,’ New Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 1999), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/26/world/guatemalan-army-waged-genocide-
new-report-finds.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) 
(after investigating the Guatemalan civil war of the 1980s, the United Nations 
concluded that the U.S. had aided the Guatemalan military, which had committed 
genocidal acts against indigenous peoples). Guatemala’s civil war devastated the 
country’s indigenous Maya communities. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Guatemala’s 
Civil War Devastated the Country’s Indigenous Maya Communities, L.A. TIMES 
(Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-guatemala-
war-aftermath-20180903-story.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review). 
Twentieth-century elites in Guatemala had clashed with those of Mayan origin 
since at least the 1960s. See Genocide in Guatemala, HOLOCAUST MUSEUM 
HOUSTON, https://hmh.org/library/research/genocide-in-guatemala-guide/ [https:// 
perma.cc/P32W-8DF5] (“Civil war existed in Guatemala since the early 1960s due 
to inequalities existing in the economic and political life. In the 1970s, the Maya 
began participating in protests against the repressive government, demanding 
greater equality and inclusion of the Mayan language and culture.”). 
While there is debate over the precise nature of the post-colonial legacy of the 
Spanish conquest of the indigenous peoples of Guatemala, the dynamic of 
repression of these groups by Spanish-speaking elites dates back to the country’s 
colonial past. See, e.g., W. George Lovell, Conquest and Survival, in COLONIAL 
GUATEMALA: A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE CUCHUMATN HIGHLANDS,  
1500–1821, at 200–201 (3d ed. 2005) (examining the impact of Spanish conquest 
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down in an effort to kill the residents, because of their indigenous 
background and A.P.F.’s environmental advocacy.  
In Guatemala, A.P.F.’s son, O.P.D., had already undergone 
major heart surgery that was necessary to save his life, with funds for 
the operation provided by a philanthropic organization. O.P.D. 
required regular cardiology check-ups and possible occasional 
emergency care, neither of which could be accessed from the family 
home in Guatemala. Because of this and the ongoing persecution of 
the family, A.P.F. decided to flee with O.P.D. to the United States. It 
took the pair two weeks to journey from Guatemala to northern 
Mexico, with O.P.D.’s health deteriorating along the way. When 
A.P.F. and O.P.D. eventually crossed the border into the United 
States, it was after midnight. Around two a.m., A.P.F. stopped to 
build a campfire, to rest and to warm O.P.D. A.P.F. hoped that the 
campfire would attract U.S. border patrol agents from whom A.P.F. 
could request asylum. A Border Patrol agent did find the father and 
son. The agent (described in the administrative filing as “tall” and 
“light-skinned”) started screaming obscenities in Spanish at O.P.D 
and A.P.F., who is five foot three inches tall. With his hand on his 
gun, the agent called them “stupid fucking animals” and kept 
demanding that A.P.F. explain “why you came to my country.” At 
first, out of fear, A.P.F. kept his head down and said nothing. When 
he eventually tried to tell the agent he and his son were seeking 
asylum and that O.P.D. had a serious medical condition, the agent 
did not acknowledge A.P.F.’s request or the information about 
O.P.D.’s health. Instead the agent put A.P.F. and O.P.D. in the back 
of a covered, air-conditioned pickup truck, where A.P.F. continued to 
try keeping O.P.D. warm. There was a three-hour wait before the pair 
arrived at a border patrol station. 
The administrative filing recounts in detail the treatment 
A.P.F. and O.P.D. received at the station, where agents told A.P.F. 
they “did not care” about O.P.D.’s heart surgery or his current 
symptoms and difficulty breathing. The agent who questioned A.P.F. 
told him that he should not have come to “my country” because “you 
do not belong here.” Eventually, A.P.F. cried and this made O.P.D. 
cry. Father and son were forced to wear thin clothing even though 
they were put into a cell known as a “hielera” or “icebox” because it 
was so cold. Crowded with about thirty occupants, there was no room 
in the cell to lie down. No matter how often A.P.F. informed agents 
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that O.P.D. was in medical distress, the agents provided no medical 
attention and eventually threatened to deprive A.P.F. of the small 
ration of food being provided to detainees in the cell. This discouraged 
A.P.F. from continuing to ask for medical help. 
After at least two days in this cell, O.P.D.’s condition 
worsened until he was severely choking. A.P.F. had to give his son 
the Heimlich maneuver, at which point agents took O.P.D. and his 
father to a hospital. There, O.P.D. was diagnosed with an acute 
respiratory infection. A.P.F. and O.P.D. were returned to the hielera 
after this hospital visit. Shortly thereafter, they witnessed an armed 
agent come to the cell, summon another father and son, and then 
shove the father into the cell and forcibly grab the son, while 
demanding the father give up the child. The boy, younger than 
O.P.D., was led away crying and screaming for his father not to let 
the agent take him. This caused other children in the cell to cry and 
scream in fear, and O.P.D. clung to his father, asking for reassurance 
that this would not happen to him. A.P.F. became fearful that, were 
O.P.D. taken, the boy would resist and endanger his precarious 
health, so he coached O.P.D. not to struggle if agents came for him. 
Later, three armed agents came to the cell and called A.P.F. and 
O.P.D. to come to them. They forcibly wrenched father and son apart. 
As agents carried him away, O.P.D. looked back at his father. O.P.D. 
was screaming and almost fainting. A.P.F. saw “incredible fear” on 
his son’s face and he believes O.P.D. saw the same on his. O.P.D. 
screamed, “Daddy, why are you letting them take me?” 
After this, A.P.F. and O.P.D. had no communication for the 
next fifty days at least. The administrative filing describes the 
unhygienic, crowded conditions of the cell to which A.P.F. was moved 
for the first ten days of this period. Food rations were extremely 
small. A.P.F. was in state of panic and anxiety about O.P.D.’s 
whereabouts and health. He was not given any information about 
these matters then or for the next three months from any government 
agent. A.P.F. had suicidal thoughts even before the agents came for 
him, manacled him, and transferred him by bus and plane to a 
different detention center. From other parents, A.P.F. learned of a 
possible phone number for O.P.D. and repeatedly attempted to 
contact his son. The calls did not go through. Despite his own pain, 
hunger, and discomfort, concern and fear for O.P.D.’s safety and 
health remained in the forefront of A.P.F.’s mind. Now under the 
control of ICE agents, A.P.F. was desperate. An officer told A.P.F. 
that ICE knew nothing about his case or O.P.D.’s whereabouts and 
that his son had been removed from him “for good.” A.P.F. felt 
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“constant agony,” and lost hope of ever seeing O.P.D. again. After 
about a month, A.P.F. and other detainees were brought to another 
room and told to sign papers written in English. ICE agents refused 
to explain what the papers said and told detainees they would have 
“problems with ICE” if they did not sign. A.P.F. signed. Two weeks 
later, ICE agents gave him another form, this time in English with a 
Spanish translation. This form gave the option of A.P.F. being 
deported alone or being deported with his son. According to A.P.F.’s 
recollection, he signed that “he wanted to be with his son.” 
After fifty days of separation, A.P.F. was briefly able to speak 
to O.P.D. by cell phone, after advocates visited the ICE facility where 
A.P.F. was held. This was the only time during a seventy-day 
separation that father and son spoke. Meanwhile, A.P.F. was told by 
his wife, who was still in Guatemala, that O.P.D. had been sexually 
abused in the foster home in New York where he had been placed by 
the U.S. government. This cast A.P.F. into a “spiral of negative 
thinking” including “self-destructive thoughts.” 
Eventually, in July 2019, A.P.F. learned of the U.S. 
government’s “zero tolerance” policy from the news, which happened 
to be on television in the room he was then in with other detainees. 
The program reported that Judge Sabraw of the U.S. District Court 
in California had ordered that affected families be reunified.155 
Several days later, without explanation, the U.S. government 
again put A.P.F. and other fathers in chains and transported them to 
a new location in Port Isabel, TX. Several more days passed. One day, 
officers returned A.P.F.’s clothes, took him and other fathers to a new 
room and unchained them. There, thirty children were released into 
the room, one by one. According to A.P.F., the children looked around 
frantically, disoriented and crying. Eventually he saw O.P.D., looking 
afraid and crying, at first unable to recognize his father. A.P.F. called 
O.P.D.’s name. O.P.D. walked toward him, still seeming not to 
recognize A.P.F. When he got closer, O.P.D. jumped into his father’s 
arms. Overcome with sorrow, they stayed still, holding each other. 
Eventually, O.P.D. started telling his father not to let “them” take 
him away again. O.P.D. repeated this concern throughout the next 
two days while he and his father were held together in Port Isabel. 
Then, without notice to them, their U.S. sponsor, or their counsel, the 
pair was released. They had no money on them and nowhere to go. 
                                                                                                             
155.  Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp 1133, 1146 
(S.D. Cal. 2018). 
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They sought refuge in a Catholic Charities shelter until A.P.F.’s 
brother, their U.S. sponsor, arranged their travel to him in California. 
The effects of the events recounted above continue to inflict 
manifest pain and suffering on A.P.F. and O.P.D. The boy is clingy, 
moody, fearful, subject to tantrums—in contrast to who he was before 
the separation. He is terrified of anybody in uniform and is reluctant 
to leave his home. His father suffers from acute headaches, 
something he did not experience prior to being separated from his 
son. To the extent the harms of the suffered by A.P.F. and O.P.D. can 
be traced to different and separate actions taken by CPB, ICE, and 
ORR, the government might try, at trial, to argue that not all of the 
damages claimed are proximately caused from the conduct that 
constitutes family separation and satisfies the outrageousness 
threshold. But A.P.F. and O.P.D. have colorable claims that all of 
their injuries flow directly from the distinctive policies and practices 
of family separation as applied to them.156 Evidence shows that the 
government was aware of the medical consensus about the harms of 
removing children from parental care and separated parents and 
children, including A.P.F. and O.P.D., anyway. The government 
seemingly failed to provide O.P.D. the care recommended by the 
American Association of Pediatricians.157 In a tort action for 
                                                                                                             
156.  There is a consensus in the medical community that family separation 
can readily disrupt both the short- and long-term health of children, creating the 
need for specialized medical care. See, e.g., Hurley Riley, The Impact of Parent-
Child Separation at the Border, U. MICH. SCH. PUB. HEALTH: PURSUIT (Sept. 7, 
2018), https://sph.umich.edu/pursuit/2018posts/family-separation-US-border.html 
[https://perma.cc/7AG4-WXL8]; Martin H. Teicher, Childhood Trauma and the 
Enduring Consequences of Forcibly Separating Children from Parents at the 
United States Border, BMC MEDICINE (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.ncbi. 
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6103973/ [https://perma.cc/M8HA-YMCS]; Sue 
Coyle, Children and Families Forum: The Impact of Immigrant Family 
Separation, 18 SOC. WORK TODAY MAG. 8, https://www.socialworktoday.com/ 
archive/SO18p8.shtml [https://perma.cc/Q4BY-M3Q5]; Patty Huang, What Are the 
Long-Term Effects of Separating Immigrant Children from Their Parents?, 
CHILDREN’S HOSP. PHILA. RES. INST. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://injury.research.chop. 
edu/blog/posts/what-are-long-term-effects-separating-immigrant-children-their-
parents [https://perma.cc/UT2D-KASP]; Key Health Implications of Separation of 
Families at the Border (as of June 27, 2018), HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 
27, 2018), https://www.kff.org/disparities-policy/fact-sheet/key-health-implica 
tions-of-separation-of-families-at-the-border/ [https://perma.cc/UQ3M-7DQ4]. 
157.  Linton et al., supra note 96, at 7–9. Among the many 
recommendations not followed, key ones include: the elimination of exposure to 
conditions and situations that will retraumatize already traumatized children; 
keeping children with a parent or primary caregiver; not holding children at CBP 
facilities because the conditions are not appropriate for their health; orienting 
478 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [51.2 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, knowing disregard for 
O.P.D.’s mental, as well as physical, health buttresses the evidence of 
extreme malice, a key element in the claim. 
Facts like those asserted by O.P.D. and A.P.F. provide the 
sort of detailed basis necessary to assert a successful claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In fact, the facts we 
recount are abbreviated compared to the administrative complaint 
and to what would be pled at trial. A.P.F. himself relied on a paper 
trail to ascertain what happened to O.P.D. while they were separated. 
Presented with such corroborating evidence, expert medical 
testimony, and credible testimony from A.P.F. and O.P.D., a 
factfinder might well conclude that the forcible separation of the boy 
from his father, the bullying, the verbal abuse, the refusal to accept 
or provide important information, the inadequate food rations, the 
freezing cold cells, and the delayed and inadequate medical care were 
“so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond 
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”158 
The government’s ability to address an influx of migrants and 
asylum-seekers is not governed solely by domestic constitutional, civil 
rights, or tort law. In the next section we turn to international law 
applicable to deliberate, harsh, and widescale family separation used 
deliberately to deter immigration to the U.S. 
IV. PROTECTIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Litigation in U.S. federal court to protect the rights and 
welfare of migrant children at and within the U.S. border relies 
primarily on judicially enforceable domestic standards, including the 
terms of the 1997 Flores settlement159 and certain provisions of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, the U.S. 
Constitution, and American common law.160 At the same time, the 
United States is also bound to comply with applicable provisions of 
                                                                                                             
children and providing them with information about what is happening and will 
happen to them. 
158.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 151. 
159.  Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544 
(RJK) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997); see supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
160.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2018) (setting forth procedures for processing 
unaccompanied alien children at the U.S. border and ports of entry); id. 
§ 1232(b)(3) (providing for transfer of unaccompanied alien children to HHS 
within 72 hours, “[e]xcept in the case of exceptional circumstances”). 
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international law found in international treaties to which the United 
States is a party, as well as in customary international law formed by 
the near-uniform practice and views of states. 
The enforceability of international legal obligations depends 
on the source of the obligation, the availability of binding dispute 
resolution mechanisms, and the willingness of states and other 
international actors to condemn and respond to violations. Although 
disputes regarding the interpretation and scope of international legal 
obligations can arise (as they do with respect to domestic law), the 
fact that the United States is legally obliged to comply with 
applicable provisions is beyond question.161 Treaties to which the 
United States is party, and customary international law rules to 
which the United States has not persistently objected, are binding on 
the United States regardless of their enforceability in U.S. courts.162 
Although the prospect of judicial enforcement certainly enhances the 
likelihood of compliance with applicable legal norms, it is by no 
means the only factor that contributes to compliance. While debates 
persist about how, and how much, international law actually 
influences state behavior, states routinely invoke international law to 
justify their own behavior and to criticize—and attempt to  
shape—the conduct of other states.163 
The Trump Administration has refused to continue 
participating in certain multilateral agreements, such as the Paris 
Climate Agreement and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA), and has been vocal in criticizing certain international 
organizations, such as the United Nations and NATO.164 Yet, this 
                                                                                                             
161.  A classic formulation remains Justice Gray’s statement in The Paquete 
Habana that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as 
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.” 
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
162.  See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008) (indicating that 
“[n]o one disputes” that the cited decision by the International Court of Justice 
“constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the United States,” 
notwithstanding disagreement about its enforceability in U.S. courts). 
163.  Contributions to these debates include Oona Hathaway & Scott J. 
Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE 
L.J. 252 (2011); Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, 
International Relations, and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 1st ed. 2002); and Benedict 
Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of 
International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 345 (1998). 
164.  See, e.g., Chimène Keitner, Sovereignty on Steroids: International 
Institutions and the Trump Administration’s “Ideology of Patriotism,” LAWFARE 
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does not amount to a wholesale rejection of international law by the 
administration, nor to a decisive rejection of U.S. participation in the 
international community. The U.S. has long held a dual position as a 
key promoter of international law and institutions, on the one hand, 
and a powerful country that can withstand a certain amount of 
external economic and political pressure, on the other. As former 
State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger stated in 2007: 
[O]ur critics sometimes paint the United States as a 
country willing to duck or shrug off international 
obligations when they prove constraining or 
inconvenient. That picture is wrong. The United 
States does believe that international law matters. We 
help develop it, rely on it, abide by it, and—contrary 
to some impressions—it has an important role in our 
nation’s Constitution and domestic law.165 
Bellinger went on to quote then-Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice’s convictions that “America’s moral authority in 
international politics also rests on our ability to defend international 
laws and treaties”166 and that “when we respect our international 
legal obligations and support an international system based on the 
rule of law, we do the work of making the world a better place, but 
also a safer and more secure place for America.”167 President Trump’s 
first Senate-confirmed State Department Legal Adviser Jennifer 
Newstead echoed this sentiment in 2018 when she wrote that “the 
United States continues to play a leading role in promoting, 
protecting, and respecting international law around the world.”168 
While one might take issue with the tenor of this characterization, it 
is still fair to say that most civil servants, and some political 
appointees, take their responsibility for ensuring the United States’ 
compliance with international law seriously. 
The relatively “lower profile” of binding international law in 
domestic legal and policy debates can be attributed both to a lack of 
                                                                                                             
(Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/sovereignty-steroids-international-
institutions-and-trump-administrations-ideology-patriotism [https://perma.cc/ 
U8SS-9JHH] (discussing former National Security Adviser John Bolton’s long-
standing hostility to the International Criminal Court). 
165.  John B. Bellinger, Legal Adviser, The United States and International 
Law, Remarks at The Hague, Netherlands (June 6, 2007), https://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/l/rls/86123.htm [https://perma.cc/V95W-U6PM]. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. 
168.  OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, DEP’T OF STATE, DIGEST OF U.S. 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW iv (2017). 
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familiarity with international law and to limitations on its direct 
enforcement by U.S. courts. For example, the Office of Legal 
Counsel’s (OLC) May 31, 2018 opinion on the President’s authority to 
“direct airstrikes on facilities associated with Syria’s chemical-
weapons capability” did not address the legality of such strikes under 
international law.169 Former OLC head Jack Goldsmith opined that 
“it is not surprising that OLC ducked that issue[]” given the difficulty 
of reconciling the strikes with the legal framework for using force 
under the United Nations Charter.170 That does not mean, however, 
that international legal considerations do not, or should not, play a 
role in this Administration’s decision-making process, whether or not 
such considerations ultimately prove decisive. Whether the current 
Supreme Court will take a more robust role in enforcing international 
law remains doubtful. As Jack Goldsmith has noted, international 
law arguments did not have a “discernible influence” in the travel ban 
litigation, and were not made by litigants and their amici with the 
vigor one might have expected.171 In Goldsmith’s view, “[t]hese 
silences might be explained by Trump’s fervent nationalism and anti-
internationalism, and the Supreme Court’s general (though not 
inevitable) aversion to the incorporation of international law.”172 The 
appointment of Justice Brett Kavanaugh is also likely to compound 
the playing down of international law in Supreme Court arguments, 
since Justice Kavanaugh has taken the position that “international 
law has no judicially cognizable role in the U.S. legal system, except 
where the political branches explicitly incorporate it by statute, 
regulation[,] or self-executing treaty.”173  
                                                                                                             
169.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum Opinion 
for the Counsel to the President (May 31, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/olc/ 
opinion/file/1067551/download [https://perma.cc/B3K7-63UH]. 
170.  Jack Goldsmith, The New OLC Opinion on Syria Brings Obama Legal 
Rationales Out of the Shadows, LAWFARE (June 1, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog. 
com/new-olc-opinion-syria-brings-obama-legal-rationales-out-shadows [https:// 
perma.cc/8WRM-VCKZ]; see also Chimène I. Keitner, Explaining International 
Acts, 63 MCGILL L.J. 1, 13–14 (2018) (discussing American attempts to justify the 
2018 Syrian airstrikes and experts rejecting their purported legality). 
171.  Jack Goldsmith, The Trump Administration and International Law, 
113 AM. J. INT’L L. 408, 410 (2019) (reviewing HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2019)). 
172.  Id. 
173.  See Scott R. Anderson, Hayley Evans & Hilary Hurd, Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh on National Security: A Reader’s Guide, LAWFARE (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/judge-brett-kavanaugh-national-security-readers-
guide [https://perma.cc/T5U8-WBFW] (describing Justice Kavanaugh’s 
concurrence in the denial of rehearing en banc in Al-Bihani v. United States). 
482 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [51.2 
Despite these doctrinal and political hurdles, lawyers 
representing migrant children and their families have long looked to 
international law as an additional source of protection for their 
clients, and government lawyers take account of international legal 
constraints in advising on policy options.174 Any analysis of the 
United States’ treatment of migrants and asylum-seekers would thus 
be incomplete without a consideration of the United States’ 
international legal commitments. Although, as noted above, 
international law rarely gives rise directly to a cause of action in the 
U.S. legal system, the Charming Betsy canon of statutory 
interpretation instructs courts to presume that Congress does not 
intend to violate international law, including international human 
rights law, unless it does so explicitly.175 Moreover, the United States 
bears international legal responsibility for violations of international 
law, regardless of whether such violations have been authorized by 
Congress or have survived challenge in U.S. courts. It is axiomatic 
that the inability to enforce an international standard through 
domestic channels, or even the existence of conflicting domestic law, 
does not absolve a state of the duty to comply with its international 
legal obligations. 
Multiple international legal standards are engaged by the 
“zero tolerance” policy and by the routine separation of child migrants 
and asylum-seekers from accompanying adults when they cross the 
                                                                                                             
174.  See, e.g., Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee 
Law: Internationalist Paths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059, 
1121 (2011) (arguing that “[i]nterpreting the INA consistently with the [Refugee] 
Convention will invariably provide a more rights-protective framework than the 
domestic immigration statute alone”); Miriam Sapiro, Advising the United States 
Government on International Law, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 619, 619 n.1 
(1995) (indicating that “[t]here is little doubt that international law is considered 
in decisionmaking”). 
175.  Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 
(1804) (holding that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the 
law of nations if any other possible construction remains”). Lawyers have long 
raised arguments in the immigration context based on the international legal 
protection of “the right to family association and integrity.” See, e.g., Brief of the 
Center for Constitutional Rights as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner-
Appellant Alfien P. Gordon, Gordon v. Mulé, 153 F. App’x 39 (2d Cir. 2005) (No. 
02-2051), 2005 WL 6426403 (arguing against a father’s deportation because 
international law protects “the right to family association and integrity” and, per 
Charming Betsy, “statutes must be construed in conformity with international law 
absent a clear statement from Congress to the contrary”). 
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U.S. border between ports of entry.176 As described above, the United 
States initiated—and has continued—a practice of forcibly separating 
minors from accompanying adults, while the adults are referred for 
criminal prosecution for illegal entry.177 Compounding the harms 
created by this practice, adequate records of separations where 
minors were apprehended while in an adult’s care have not been 
maintained, thereby effectively “orphaning” children and 
dramatically reducing the prospect of family reunification.178 The 
conditions of confinement of these children, as well as their prolonged 
detention, also violate relevant international legal obligations 
separate from the violations associated with the act of continued 
separation.179 The acknowledgment by senior U.S. officials that these 
measures are intended to be punitive and to deter would-be 
immigrants from crossing the southern border also carries legal 
significance, although the practice would still be internationally 
unlawful even if it did not have a punitive intent.180 
                                                                                                             
176.  According to one report, in some cases “immigrant families 
are . . . separated after . . . presenting themselves for asylum . . . [even though] 
Trump administration officials claim . . . they only separate families at ports of 
entry [for] the safety of the child, or if they don’t think . . . that the adult is really 
the child’s legal custodian.” Dara Lind, The Trump Administration’s Separation of 
Families at the Border, Explained, VOX (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.vox.com/ 
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177.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-
18-84, SPECIAL REVIEW—INITIAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING FAMILY SEPARATION 
ISSUES UNDER THE ZERO TOLERANCE POLICY 4 (Sept. 27, 2018). This practice has 
continued, with a reported 700 separations carried out between June 2018 and 
May 2019. See Lomi Kriel & Dug Begley, Trump Administration Still Separating 
Hundreds of Migrant Children at the Border Through Often Questionable Claims 
of Danger, HOUSTON CHRON. (June 22, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/ 
news/houston-texas/houston/article/Trump-administration-still-separating-
hundreds-of-14029494.php [https://perma.cc/5WCS-T7HK]; Michelle Goldberg, 
The Terrible Things Trump is Doing in Our Name, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/opinion/family-separation-trump-migrants. 
html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
178.  Lind, supra note 176. 
179.  See infra Section II.A. 
180.  President Trump stated that his policy acts as a deterrent for people 
coming to the United States: “We want a great country . . . . But when people 
come up, they have to know they can’t get in. Otherwise it’s never going to stop.” 
Later he said: “When you prosecute the parents for coming in illegally, which 
should happen, you have to take the children away. Now, we don’t have to 
prosecute them, but then we’re not prosecuting them for coming in illegally. 
That’s not good.” President Donald Trump, Remarks at the National Federation of 
Independent Businesses 75th Anniversary Celebration (June 18, 2018); see also 
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The United States’ treatment of migrant children and 
families is a legitimate matter of international concern, as the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Human Rights made clear in his June 2018 
“global update” to the Human Rights Council.181 It is worth 
cataloguing some of the criticism the United States has received for 
this practice from the international community. For example, later in 
June 2018, the Permanent Council of the Organization of American 
States issued a resolution reminding the United States of its 
international legal obligation to respect the human rights of 
migrants, and especially children.182 In August 2018, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights granted a request for 
precautionary measures received from six countries’ National 
Institutions of Human Rights.183 As a threshold matter, the 
Commission found that children who are separated from their 
parents as a result of the “zero tolerance” policy are at risk of 
“serious, urgent and irreparable harm” to the rights to a family life, 
personal integrity, and identity guaranteed by the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.184 More recently, in July 
                                                                                                             
Van Schaack, supra note 2 (arguing that footage from a 60 Minutes segment 
corroborates that the intent of the family separation policy was to deter 
immigration). 
181.  Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, Opening Statement by U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (June 18, 2018) https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23206&LangID=E [https:// 
perma.cc/3Q3J-XJDR]; see also Press Briefing Note on Egypt, United States, and 
Ethiopia, UNHCR, https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews. 
aspx?NewsID=23174&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/B7HZ-FUEB] (indicating that 
“the practice of separating families amounts to arbitrary and unlawful 
interference in family life, and is a serious violation of the rights of the child”). 
182.  Permanent Council Res. 1106 (2168/18) (July 6, 2018). 
183.  Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 64/2018 (Aug. 16, 2018), 
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/pdf/2018/64-18MC731-18-US-en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ETE7-PG95]. A complaint has also been filed against the United 
States with the U.N. Human Rights Council by fifteen U.S. civil society groups, 
although it is not clear that the Council will find the complaint admissible under 
its procedures. See Human Rights Council Complaint Procedure Form, HUMAN 
RIGHTS COUNCIL, https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/un-humrts-complaint_ 
062018.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCT8-QJB4]. The same month the complaint was 
filed, the United States withdrew as a member of the 47-country Human Rights 
Council, although this does not in itself deprive the Council of the ability to 
consider complaints against the United States. See Colin Dwyer, U.S. Announces 
Its Withdrawal from U.N. Human Rights Council, NPR (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/621435225/u-s-announces-its-withdrawal-from-u-
n-s-human-rights-council [https://perma.cc/QQ8D-E8WH]. 
184.  Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 64/2018 at 5 (Aug. 16, 
2018), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/pdf/2018/64-18MC731-18-US-en.pdf 
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2019, the new U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights decried 
the conditions of confinement of refugee and migrant children and 
adults in the United States, and made clear that children should 
never be held in immigration detention or separated from their 
families.185 Also in July 2019, the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution on the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border in which it 
invoked international human rights obligations and emphasized that, 
among other things, “depriving children of their liberty on the basis of 
their or their parents’ migration status is never in the best interests 
of the child . . . and may constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment of migrant children.”186 Moreover, as affirmed by the E.U. 
Parliament, “illegal family separations and the arbitrary and 
indefinite detention of asylum seekers without parole constitute cruel 
policies and flagrant violations of both U.S. asylum law and 
international law.”187 Although not legally binding on the United 
States, these pronouncements reflect a consensus that recent U.S. 
practice does not comply with U.S. obligations. To date, other 
countries have not adopted stronger measures to try and compel U.S. 
compliance (likely because of an assessment that this does not 
represent a high enough foreign policy priority to risk incurring the 
                                                                                                             
[https://perma.cc/ETE7-PG95]; Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 5, May 2, 1948, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3710.html [https://perma.cc/3SGH-HFL6]. A 
coalition of holders of U.N. “special procedures” mandates has also officially 
communicated its concerns to the U.S. government about issues including “the 
automatic separation of children from their families in violation of the best 
interests of the child and their rights to liberty and family life.” Letter from 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention et al. to the U.N. (June 19, 2018), 
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunication
File?gId=23913 [https://perma.cc/S3GH-B87V]. Among other possible 
international law violations, the communication specifically calls out “the use of 
immigration detention and family separation as a punitive deterrent of irregular 
entry, contrary to international human rights norms and standards” and 
emphasizes that “[t]he best interests of the child should be the paramount 
consideration, including in the context of migration management, and children 
should never be detained for reasons related to their own or their parents’ 
migration status, as detention of children in the context of migration constitutes a 
human rights violation.” Id. at 3. 
185.  Bachelet Appalled by Conditions of Migrants and Refugees in 
Detention in the US, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24800 
[https://perma.cc/5D8L-A87N]. 
186.  Res. 2019/2733 of the Eur. Parl. on the Situation at the USA-Mexico 
border (July 18, 2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2019-
0005_EN.html?redirect [https://perma.cc/AZL5-EU8X]. 
187.  Id. 
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accompanying costs). However, there is no doubt that the United 
States’ global standing—and its moral authority and ability to 
persuade other countries to comply with international legal 
standards—have been severely damaged.188 
International human rights law governs how states treat 
individuals within their jurisdiction. These standards apply 
indisputably to all individuals who are on U.S. territory (regardless of 
how they entered), although the United States generally maintains 
that it does not also constrain the conduct of U.S. officials towards 
individuals who are not present on U.S. territory.189 That said, the 
United States’ exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction to prosecute 
adults for illegal border crossings, and to hold adults and children in 
detention facilities, clearly brings those individuals within the scope 
of the United States’ international human rights obligations.190 The 
rest of this section examines these obligations under four non-
exhaustive categories: special protections afforded children; the 
requirement of humane and non-punitive treatment; the right to a 
family life; and the right to be free from cruel, inhumane, or 
degrading treatment.191 It concludes with a brief discussion of the 
                                                                                                             
188.  See, e.g., Tania Karas, U.S. Leads Global “Race to the Bottom” in 
Shutting Door on Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, PRI: WORLD (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-09-17/us-leads-global-race-bottom-shutting-door-
refugees-and-asylum-seekers [https://perma.cc/Y4KJ-UPXP]. 
189.  U.S. Observations on Human Rights Committee General Comment 31, 
U.S STATE DEP’T (Dec. 27, 2007), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/l/2007/112674.htm 
[https://perma.cc/968P-E6FX]. Other countries and experts disagree with this 
interpretation and view this treaty language as encompassing both individuals 
within a country’s territory and individuals within that country’s jurisdiction. 
190.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 10, 13, 14, 
17, 23, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees art. 16, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 16, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
191.  Other international legal prohibitions that commentators and 
international bodies have suggested might be implicated include: the prohibition 
on torture, the prohibition on forced disappearances, the prohibition on both 
intentional and unintentional discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or 
national origin, and the right to personal integrity and to identity. This article’s 
focus on the four categories of rights enumerated above does not diminish the 
importance of ensuring respect for other human rights. See Beth Van Schaack, 
The Torture of Forcibly Separating Children from Their Parents, JUST SECURITY 
(Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/61138/torture-forcibly-separating-
children-parents/ [https://perma.cc/PT7J-V4E9] (torture); Van Schaack, supra 
note 2 (torture); Amnesty International Statement for March 26 Hearing on “The 
Department of Homeland Security’s Family Separation Policy: Perspectives from 
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international right to a remedy, and highlights the inconsistency 
between recent U.S. advocacy on behalf of vulnerable children outside 
the United States, and its treatment of vulnerable children taken 
from their parents by U.S. officials after they have crossed the 
southern border. 
A. Special Protections Afforded Children 
Although the United States has gained notoriety for being the 
only country that has signed but not ratified the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), this does not mean that children in the 
United States lack international legal protections.192 First, the United 
States is bound by customary international law. While the content of 
customary international law may be contested at the margins, certain 
core prohibitions are acknowledged as legally binding on states 
regardless of whether or not the state has ratified a specific treaty. 
These standards include the categorical prohibitions on slavery and 
torture, as well as other types of norms such as—under some 
accounts—the “best interests of the child” principle.193 Second, 
                                                                                                             
the Border,” AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.amnestyusa.org/our-
work/government-relations/advocacy/amnesty-international-statement-for-march-
26-hearing-on-the-department-of-homeland-securitys-family-separation-policy-
perspectives-from-the-border/ [https://perma.cc/BT9L-C7E9] (torture); Alonso 
Gurmendi, On Calling Things What They Are: Family Separation and Enforced 
Disappearance of Children, OPINIOJURIS (June 24, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/ 
2019/06/24/on-calling-things-what-they-are-family-separation-and-enforced-
disappearance-of-children/ [https://perma.cc/DQH3-J2BM] (forced disappearance); 
Letter from Working Group on Arbitrary Detention et. al. to the U.N., supra note 
184 (discrimination); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Precautionary Measure No. 731-18: Migrant Children Affected by the “Zero 
Tolerance” Policy Regarding the United States of America, ORG. OF AMERICAN 
STATES (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/pdf/2018/64-
18MC731-18-US-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/AFX3-LV89] (personal integrity and 
identity). 
192.  Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
South Sudan became the CRC’s 195th state party in 2015. There is a general 
understanding that signatories to a treaty are obliged not to take actions that 
would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty until they have indicated their 
intention not to ratify the treaty, but this prohibition has more rhetorical than 
legal force when it comes to multilateral human rights treaties. See Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter VCLT]. 
193.  Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of 
International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 230 n.111 (2003). Brilmayer and 
Starr note that the “best interests” standard originally derived from U.S. family 
law. See id. at 225; see also Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) 
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children in the United States benefit from human rights protections 
in treaties that are not child-specific, such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the United 
States has ratified.194 Thus, although more extensive and detailed 
provisions regarding the rights of child refugees and migrants are 
more often found in so-called “soft law” instruments that are not in 
themselves legally binding, the United States’ non-ratification of the 
CRC does not affect its obligations under customary international law 
and under other applicable treaties.195 
The special protection accorded children under international 
law is reflected in the ICCPR, which provides that “[e]very child shall 
have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such 
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor.”196 As 
the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
emphasized in a 2010 report: 
The principal normative standards of child protection 
are equally applicable to migrant children and 
children implicated in the process of migration. 
Accordingly, international law provides that all such 
children be seen and protected as children first and 
foremost, rather than letting their migratory or other 
status, or that of their parents, dictate their access to 
protection and assistance.197 
                                                                                                             
(reversed on other grounds) (applying the “best interests” principle as a matter of 
customary international law); cf. Starr & Brilmayer, supra, at 230 (noting in 2003 
that, because family separation occurs in a variety of factual circumstances and 
state practice is not sufficiently uniform, it would be premature to declare that 
customary international law contains a blanket prohibition on family separation). 
On the failure of the United States to respect the “best interests” principle in 
immigration law more generally, see Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a ‘Best 
Interests of the Child’ Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE 
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120 (2009). 
194.  ICCPR, supra note 190, art. 1. 
195.  Human Rights Watch Submits Comments on Proposed Rule Regarding 
the Detention of Children and Families, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 6, 2018), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/11/06/human-rights-watch-submits-comments-
proposed-rule-regarding-detention-children-and [https://perma.cc/F5X3-5U77]. 
196.  ICCPR, supra note 190, art. 24. 
197.  U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Study of the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Challenges and Best 
Practices in the Implementation of the International Framework for the 
Protection of the Rights of the Child in the Context of Migration, at 5, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/15/29 (July 5, 2010). 
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In carrying out deliberate and widespread family separations 
beginning in the spring of 2018, U.S. authorities rendered 
accompanied refugee and migrant children even more vulnerable by 
turning them into unaccompanied children, thereby incurring 
additional obligations for their protection and care. 
Because children are among the most vulnerable members of 
society, refugee law has long considered the particular plight of 
children, including unaccompanied or separated children.198 However, 
it is fair to say that the development of norms for protecting refugee 
children and reunifying families has, until now, taken place 
primarily, if not exclusively, in response to inadvertent family 
separations caused by armed conflicts, natural disasters, and other 
circumstances beyond the control of the destination state. The idea 
that a destination state would intentionally separate arriving 
children from their families for the purpose of deterring other would-
                                                                                                             
198.  Refugee guidelines have generally reserved the term “unaccompanied 
children” for “children who are separated from both parents and are not being 
cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, is responsible for doing so,” while 
“separated children” are “children under 18 years who are separated from both 
parents or from their previous legal or customary primary caregiver,” but who 
may currently be with an extended family member. See Daniel J. Steinbock, 
Separated Children in Mass Migration: Causes and Cures, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 297, 298 n.5 (2003); see generally Kate Jastram & Kathleen Newland, Family 
Unity and Refugee Protection in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (E. Feller et 
al., eds., 2003) (emphasizing the role of family unity and the dangers resulting 
from its disruption); Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Unaccompanied Refugee Minors: The 
Role and Place of International Law in the Pursuit of Durable Solutions, 3 INT’L J. 
CHILD. RTS. 405 (1995) (outlining the international efforts to protect child 
refugees); HANNA GROS & YOLANDA SONG, UNIV. OF TORONTO FACULTY OF LAW, 
NO LIFE FOR A CHILD: A ROADMAP TO END IMMIGRATION DETENTION OF CHILDREN 
AND FAMILY SEPARATION (2016), https://ihrp.law.utoronto.ca/sites/default/ 
files/PUBLICATIONS/Report-NoLifeForAChild.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2UJ-
HCDQ] (arguing for changes to the Canadian immigration system due to its 
practical implications and insufficient legal justifications); KRISTINA TOUZENIS, 
INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANT CHILDREN (2008), 
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_15_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
R2BQ-HKZB] (summarizing some of the most important protections provided to 
child refugees); Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration 
and/or in Need of International Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 21 (Aug. 19, 2014) (setting forth the obligations that 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay must comply with in relation to the 
human rights of migrants). 
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be refugees and migrants has simply not been contemplated as a 
serious possibility.199 
The long-term harms caused to children by potentially 
indefinite family separation, and by even short periods of 
immigration detention, have been well documented.200 Consequently, 
a wide variety of international instruments seek to avoid and to 
remedy situations in which separation or detention occurs.201 The 
                                                                                                             
199.  This is not to say that family separation is unknown as a tool of state 
policy in other contexts. To the contrary, the historical experiences of indigenous 
peoples in Canada and Australia, and the current experience of Uighurs in China, 
make painfully clear that family separation has occurred outside this context. See, 
e.g., Reconciliation, GOV’T OF CANADA (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.rcaanc-
cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1400782178444/1529183710887 [https://perma.cc/694V-VK6C] 
(showing the Canadian government’s long-overdue attempts to apologize for and 
redress historical wrongs); AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, BRINGING 
THEM HOME REPORT (1997), https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/ 
files/content/pdf/social_justice/bringing_them_home_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
DJ58-KJKZ] (reporting on Australia’s “stolen generation”). International criticism 
of China’s policy has been more muted, in part because of a systematic Chinese 
campaign to deflect scrutiny. See, e.g., Nick Cumming-Bruce, China Rebuked by 
22 Nations over Xinjiang Repression, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-rights.html (on file 
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (noting that, since the United 
States withdrew from the U.N. Human Rights Council, “[d]iplomats said there 
was little prospect of another country leading a resolution in the council and 
exposing itself to the political and economic retaliation China often threatens 
against states that criticize it, especially in prominent forums”). 
200.  See Linton et al., supra note 96; Chloe Reichel, How Detention Centers 
Affect the Health of Immigrant Children: A Research Roundup, JOURNALIST’S 
RESOURCE (July 22, 2019), https://journalistsresource.org/studies/government/ 
immigration/health-effects-immigration-detention-children/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Q7QM-55SR]; see generally Zachary Steel et al., Global Protection and the Health 
Impact of Migration Interception, PLOS MED., June 2011, at 1 (describing the 
particular harms of immigration detention on children). 
201.  General rights that are potentially implicated by the U.S. policy 
include: American Convention on Human Rights art. 5 (right to humane 
treatment), art. 7 (right to personal liberty), art. 24 (right to equal protection); 
San Salvador Protocol to American Convention art. 3 (obligation of non-
discrimination), art. 10 (right to health), art. 12 (right to food), art. 13 (right to 
education), art. 15 (right to the protection of families). See American Convention 
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. Child-
specific protections include: American Convention on Human Rights art. 19 
(rights of the child to “the measures of protection required by his condition as a 
minor”); San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention art. 6 (rights of 
children); Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7.1 (right of the child to be 
cared for, as far as possible, by his or her parents), art. 8.1 (right of the child to 
preserve his or her identity), art. 9.1 (right not to be separated from his or her 
parents except when such separation is necessary for the best interests of the 
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CRC Committee has observed that “the detention of a child because of 
their or their parent’s migration status constitutes a child rights 
violation and always contravenes the principle of the best interests of 
the child.”202 The U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
have all indicated that the detention of a child cannot be justified 
solely on the basis of the migration status of that child or her 
parent.203 Similarly, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Migrants has called on states to “preserve the 
family unit by applying alternatives to detention to the entire family,” 
                                                                                                             
child), art. 9.3 (right of a separated child to maintain personal relations and direct 
contact with both parents on a regular basis), art. 19 (right to protection from all 
forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, and sexual abuse), art. 20 (entitlement 
to special protection and assistance provided by the State for a child temporarily 
or permanently deprived of his or her family environment), art. 22 (appropriate 
protection and humanitarian assistance for children seeking refugee status), art. 
23 (rights of disabled children), art. 24 (right to access health services), art. 28 
(right to an education), art. 37 (treatment of all children deprived of liberty with 
humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a 
manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age). Id.; see 
San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 17, 
1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69; Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, 
44 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989). The United States is not 
a party to any of these instruments, meaning that they are binding on the United 
States only insofar as their provisions are reflected in other treaties to which the 
United States is a party or can be said to constitute customary international law. 
Provisions that arguably have attained customary international law status 
include, at a minimum, the imperative of considering the best interests of the 
child, the right to humane treatment, and the obligation of non-discrimination. 
With respect to detained children in particular, see General Assembly Resolution 
45/113 of 14 Dec. 1990 on UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of 
Their Liberty. Although U.N. General Assembly resolutions are not legally 
binding, they frequently articulate international standards of conduct, including 
standards that the United States has encouraged other countries to follow in their 
treatment of vulnerable populations. 
202.  Rep. of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Report of the 2012 Day 
of General Discussion on the Rights of All Children in the Context of 
International Migration (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
HRBodies/CRC/Discussions/2012/DGD2012ReportAndRecommendations.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4GAE-FYXM]; see also INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP, ENDING 
CHILD IMMIGRATION DETENTION, https://endchilddetention.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/09/IAWG_Advocacy-Brochure_Aug-2016_FINAL-web.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5XSG-CNJ8]; Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of 
Migration and/or Need of International Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Aug. 19, 2014). 
203.  See GROS & SONG, supra note 198. 
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and to only resort to detaining parents accompanied by their children 
“in very exceptional circumstances.”204 
The Nelson Mandela Rules adopted by the U.N. General 
Assembly in 2015 also contain specific relevant provisions.205 Of 
particular note, the rules provide that there shall always be a 
standardized prisoner file management system, and that upon 
admission of every prisoner, information shall be entered in the file 
management system indicating “[t]he names of his or her family 
members, including, where applicable, his or her children, the 
children’s ages, location and custody or guardianship status.”206 The 
fact that family separations were carried out by U.S. officials without 
any plan or effort to keep track of family units or to identify which 
children arrived with accompanying adults directly contravenes the 
Mandela Rules endorsed by members of the General Assembly, 
including the United States. The United States continues to 
emphasize the importance of these rules, and even provides technical 
assistance to other countries to encourage their compliance.207 
The most generous reading of the family separation policy is 
that children were rendered unaccompanied as a negligent and 
foreseeable by-product, rather than a deliberate goal, of the “zero 
tolerance” program. Although statements by officials instead support 
the view that separation was itself intended as a penalty for crossing 
the border illegally, even unintended consequences violate children’s 
rights. A joint general comment by two human rights treaty bodies 
makes clear that 
authorities responsible for migration and other 
related policies that affect children’s rights 
should . . . systematically assess and address the 
                                                                                                             
204.  Francois Crepeau, Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants, Rep. on the Human Rights of Migrants, A/HRC/20/24 at 11 (Apr. 2, 
2012). 
205.  G.A. Res. 70/175 (Jan. 8, 2016). 
206.  Id. at Rule 7(f). 
207.  Bureau of Int’l Narcotics & Law Enf’t Affairs, INL Work in the Field of 
Corrections, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/inl-work-in-the-field-of-
corrections/ [https://perma.cc/3R2E-EY27]; see also Bureau of Int’l Narcotics & 
Law Enf’t Affairs, Strengthening Criminal Justice Institutions, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, https://www.state.gov/supporting-rights-and-justice/ [https://perma.cc/ 
J8ZM-NCHJ] (indicating that “INL also participates in establishing global standards 
on corrections policy, and is proud to have been an active supporter of the revised 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMRs), 
known as The Nelson Mandela Rules, which were updated in 2015 after almost 50 
years.”). 
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impacts on and needs of children in the context of 
international migration at every stage of 
policymaking and implementation.208 
This imperative should flow self-evidently from due regard for 
the best interests of the child—not to mention basic decency and 
common sense.209 
B. The Requirement of Humane and Non-Punitive Treatment 
The United States has often been reticent to join binding 
international human rights agreements for a variety of reasons, 
including the concern that international agreements require 
sacrificing “sovereignty,” and the conviction that domestic law fully 
and adequately protects individuals within the United States.210 That 
said, the United States has participated in, and even spearheaded, 
“soft law” instruments, such as U.N. General Assembly Resolutions, 
that articulate guiding principles for decent and humane societies, as 
exemplified by Eleanor Roosevelt’s leading role in the adoption of the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.211 In addition to 
                                                                                                             
208.  U.N. Comm. on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families, Joint General Comment No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
CMW/C/GC/3 (Nov. 16, 2017) (outlining state obligations regarding the human 
rights of children in the context of international migration in countries of origin, 
transit, destination and return). 
209.  See supra note 192 and accompanying text; see also CRC Committee 
Gen. Cmt. 14 (2013), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/14 (outlining the importance of 
prioritizing the best interests of the child when making policy decisions, including 
by avoiding family separation). In a 2017 statement, the United States dissociated 
itself from the “best interests of the child” principle in the context of international 
migration on the grounds that it is “derived from the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child.” This statement neglects the other sources of this principle, including 
U.S. family law. See Laurie Shestack Phipps, Adviser, Explanation of Position on 
Protection of Migrants, U.S. Mission to the U.N. (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-position-on-agenda-item-72b-a-c-3-72-l-
43-rev-1-on-protection-of-migrants [https://perma.cc/9YBG-FDAA]. 
210.  See, e.g., Greg Staff, Adviser, U.S. Mission to the U.N., Explanation of 
Vote on A/C.3/72/L.21/Rev.1 on Rights of the Child (Nov. 21, 2017), 
https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-vote-on-a-c-3-72-l-21-rev-1-on-rights-of-
the-child/?_ga=2.206287251.1275170924.1565159692-756070021.1562701866 
[https://perma.cc/62D7-AC4A] (stating that “we underscore that the United States 
fulfills its applicable international obligations to promote and protect the human 
rights of migrants by providing substantial protections under the U.S. 
Constitution and domestic laws to individuals within the territory of the United 
States, regardless of their immigration status”). 
211.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
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helping to draft and promulgate the Mandela Rules cited above, the 
United States also supported the New York Declaration for Refugees 
and Migrants adopted by the General Assembly in September 2016.212 
Although the Trump Administration subsequently disavowed the 
principles enshrined in the declaration, it continues to represent an 
articulation of widely shared goals and aspirations, as well as a 
reaffirmation of established legal principles relating to the treatment 
of migrants and refugees.213 
The New York Declaration affirms countries’ “profound 
solidarity with, and support for, the millions of people in different 
parts of the world who, for reasons beyond their control, are forced to 
uproot themselves and their families from their homes.”214 In 
adopting the resolution, all 193 U.N. member states explicitly 
“acknowledge[d] a shared responsibility to manage large movements 
of refugees and migrants in a humane, sensitive, compassionate and 
people-centred manner.”215 They declared that “[d]iversity enriches 
every society and contributes to social cohesion,” and that 
“[d]emonizing refugees or migrants offends profoundly against the 
values of dignity and equality for every human being, to which we 
have committed ourselves.”216 In adopting the declaration, all U.N. 
members pledged to “ensure a people-centred, sensitive, humane, 
dignified, gender-responsive and prompt reception for all persons 
arriving in our countries, and particularly those in large movements, 
whether refugees or migrants” and to “ensure full respect and 
protection for their human rights and fundamental freedoms.”217 They 
further pledged to “ensure that public officials and law enforcement 
officers who work in border areas are trained to uphold the human 
rights of all persons crossing, or seeking to cross, international 
borders” and to “intensify support in this area and help to build 
capacity as appropriate,” while recognizing that “while upholding 
these obligations and principles, States are entitled to take measures 
                                                                                                             
212.  G.A. Res. 71/1, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 
(Sept. 19, 2016). 
213.  Patrick Wintour, Donald Trump Pulls US out of UN Global Compact 
on Migration, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ 
dec/03/donald-trump-pulls-us-out-of-un-global-compact-on-migration (on file with 
the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
214.  G.A. Res. 71/1, supra note 212, ¶ 8. 
215.  Id. ¶ 11. 
216.  Id. ¶ 14; see also id. ¶ 39 (stating “[w]e commit to combating 
xenophobia, racism and discrimination in our societies against refugees and 
migrants”). 
217.  Id. ¶ 22. 
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to prevent irregular border crossings.”218 Of particular relevance, 
states committed to protecting “the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of all refugee and migrant children, regardless of their 
status, and giving primary consideration at all times to the best 
interests of the child,” and affirmed that this commitment applies 
“particularly to unaccompanied children and those separated from 
their families.”219 Once again, it does not appear to have occurred to 
the declaration’s drafters that a country of arrival would itself cause 
children to be separated from their families, thereby becoming the 
most immediate threat to the safety and well-being of refugee and 
migrant children who managed to survive the journey from their 
country of origin.220 
In addition to reciting the above political commitments, the 
New York Declaration restates the core international legal principles 
relating to immigration detention as follows: 
Reaffirming that all individuals who have crossed or 
are seeking to cross international borders are entitled 
to due process in the assessment of their legal status, 
entry and stay, we will consider reviewing policies 
that criminalize cross-border movements. We will also 
pursue alternatives to detention while these 
assessments are under way. Furthermore, recognizing 
that detention for the purposes of determining 
migration status is seldom, if ever, in the best interest 
of the child, we will use it only as a measure of last 
resort, in the least restrictive setting, for the shortest 
possible period of time, under conditions that respect 
their human rights and in a manner that takes into 
account, as a primary consideration, the best interest 
of the child, and we will work towards the ending of 
this practice.221 
                                                                                                             
218.  Id. ¶ 24; see also id. ¶ 41 (affirming that “[w]e are committed to 
protecting the safety, dignity and human rights and fundamental freedoms of all 
migrants, regardless of their migratory status, at all times”). 
219.  Id. ¶ 32. 
220.  Cf. id. ¶ 29 (indicating that “[w]e recognize and will take steps to 
address the particular vulnerabilities of women and children during the journey 
from country of origin to country of arrival”) (emphasis added). 
221.  Id. ¶ 33; see also id. ¶ 56 (stating that “[w]e affirm that children 
should not be criminalized or subject to punitive measures because of their 
migration status or that of their parents”); id. ¶ 59 (declaring that “[w]e reaffirm 
our commitment to protect the human rights of migrant children, given their 
vulnerability, particularly unaccompanied migrant children, and to provide access 
to basic health, education and psychosocial services, ensuring that the best 
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Despite the international consensus supporting these goals, 
and the legal obligations underpinning many of them, the United 
States sharply reversed course a year after the Declaration’s 
unanimous adoption. On December 2, 2017, the United States 
announced its “withdrawal” from the New York Declaration and 
associated process for increasing global cooperation on migration, on 
the grounds that “[t]he New York Declaration contains numerous 
provisions that are inconsistent with U.S. immigration policy and the 
Trump Administration’s immigration principles.”222 
The U.S. government has taken other steps to make clear 
that it does not regard itself as bound by the commitments embodied 
in the New York Declaration, although it does acknowledge an 
obligation to comply with already-existing laws. For example, in a 
November 2018 explanation of a “no” vote in the U.N. on an omnibus 
resolution that referred to the New York Declaration, the U.S. 
representative objected to language in the resolution “regarding 
alternatives to detention and the ‘need’ to limit the detention of 
asylum seekers,” and reiterated that the United States “will detain 
and prosecute those who enter U.S. territory illegally, consistent with 
our domestic immigration laws and our international interests.”223 As 
one of only two U.N. members (along with Hungary) to have voted 
against the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees, the United States also 
emphasized its “understanding that none of the Compact’s provisions 
create or affect rights or obligations of states under international law, 
or otherwise change the current state of conventional or customary 
international law.”224 That said, the Declaration and Compact also 
                                                                                                             
interests of the child is a primary consideration in all relevant policies”); id. ¶ 70 
(maintaining that “[w]e will also promote access for [refugee] children to child-
appropriate procedures”). 
222.  United States Ends Participation in Global Compact on Migration, 
U.S. MISSION TO THE U.N. (Dec. 2, 2017), https://usun.usmission.gov/united-
states-ends-participation-in-global-compact-on-migration/ [https://perma.cc/PY9H-
CQV5]. 
223.  Explanation of Vote in a Meeting of the Third Committee on a UNHCR 
Omnibus Resolution, U.S. MISSION TO THE U.N. (Nov. 13, 2018), 
https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-vote-in-a-meeting-of-the-third-
committee-on-a-unhcr-omnibus-resolution/ [https://perma.cc/3RV2-NKP3]. 
224.  Id.; see also Remarks to the UN General Assembly on the Global 
Compact for Migration Resolution, U.S. MISSION TO THE U.N. (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-to-the-un-general-assembly-on-the-global-
compact-for-migration-resolution/ [https://perma.cc/WZK6-AJCK] (emphasizing 
the U.S. concern that “Compact supporters, recognizing the lack of widespread 
support for a legally-binding international migration convention, seek to use the 
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reference certain obligations that are already part of conventional 
and/or customary law. They could help catalyze other emerging 
norms by shaping future state practice, if not that of the United 
States. 
Among other legally binding obligations, the 1967 Protocol to 
the Refugee Convention (to which the United States is a party) 
obliges the United States to comply with Article 31 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention, which provides: 
1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, 
on account of their illegal entry or presence, on 
refugees who, coming directly from a territory where 
their life or freedom was threatened . . . , enter or are 
present in their territory without authorization, 
provided they present themselves without delay to the 
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry 
or presence. 
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the 
movements of such refugees restrictions other than 
those which are necessary and such restrictions shall 
only be applied until their status in the country is 
regularized or they obtain admission into another 
country. The Contracting States shall allow such 
refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary 
facilities to obtain admission into another country.225 
Needless to say, countries routinely argue that their 
immigration detention regimes comply with the letter of this law, 
while advocates highlight the inconsistency between routine 
detention intended as a deterrent and the prohibition on imposing 
“penalties” on refugees on account of their illegal entry.226 Guy 
Goodwin-Gill points out that, even apart from obligations under the 
Refugee Convention, “[t]o impose penalties without regard to the 
merits of an individual’s claim to be a refugee will likely also violate 
                                                                                                             
Compact and its outcomes and objectives as a long-term means of building 
customary international law or so-called ‘soft law’ in the area of migration.”). 
225.  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 31, July 28, 1951, 
19 U.S.T. 6577; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. 
226.  See generally GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, ARTICLE 31 OF THE 1951 
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: NON-PENALIZATION, 
DETENTION AND PROTECTION (2001) (analyzing Article 31 and incorporation of its 
principles). 
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the obligation of the State to ensure and to protect the human rights 
of everyone within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction.”227 
Multiple studies detail viable alternatives to immigration 
detention.228 In the context of updating its directive laying down 
standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, 
the European Parliament reaffirmed: 
The detention of applicants [for asylum] should be 
applied in accordance with the underlying principle 
that a person should not be held in detention for the 
sole reason that he or she is seeking international 
protection, particularly in accordance with the 
international legal obligations of the Member States 
and with Article 31 of the Geneva Convention. 
Applicants may be detained only under very clearly 
defined exceptional circumstances laid down in this 
Directive and subject to the principle of necessity and 
proportionality with regard to both to the manner and 
the purpose of such detention.229 
Moreover, “[a]pplicants who are in detention should be 
treated with full respect for human dignity and their reception should 
be specifically designed to meet their needs in that situation.”230 
With respect to children in particular, the EU Directive 
provides that “[t]he best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration for Member States when implementing the provisions 
of this Directive that involve minors,” and that “Member States shall 
ensure a standard of living adequate for the minor’s physical, mental, 
spiritual, moral and social development.”231 Critically, “Member 
                                                                                                             
227.  Id. at 2; see ICCPR, supra note 190, art. 2(1). 
228.  See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUR., HUMAN RIGHTS AND MIGRATION: LEGAL 
AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF MIGRATION (2017), https://rm.coe.int/legal-and-practical-aspects-of-
effective-alternatives-to-detention-in-/16808f699f [https://perma.cc/5K74-EXD5] 
(describing alternatives); G.A. Res. 64/142, Annex (Feb. 24, 2010) (emphasizing 
that, among other imperatives, “[c]hildren must be treated with dignity and 
respect at all times and must benefit from effective protection from abuse, neglect 
and all forms of exploitation, whether on the part of care providers, peers or third 
parties, in whatever care setting they may find themselves,” and that “[i]n 
accordance with the predominant opinion of experts, alternative care for young 
children, especially those under the age of 3 years, should be provided in family-
based settings”). 
229.  Council Directive 2013/33/EU, ¶ 15, 2013 O.J. (L 180/96) (Eur. Parl. 
and Council). 
230.  Id. 
231.  Id.; see ICCPR, supra note 190, art. 23. 
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States shall ensure that minor children of applicants or applicants 
who are minors are lodged with their parents, their unmarried minor 
siblings or with the adult responsible for them whether by law or by 
the practice of the Member State concerned, provided it is in the best 
interests of the minors concerned.”232 Although the EU Directive as 
such is clearly not legally binding on the United States, the 
imperatives that detention should not imposed as a penalty and that 
it must be done in a manner consistent with human dignity and the 
best interests of the child mirror requirements in existing 
conventional and customary international law. 
C. The Right to a Family Life  
Separating migrant children from their parents also 
contravenes the children’s and the parents’ right to a family life. 
Ironically, U.S. Senators who objected to ratifying the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) emphasized their view that “the 
primary safeguard for the well-being and protection of children is the 
family.”233 The Conference of Plenipotentiaries responsible for 
drafting the 1951 Refugee Convention, which included a delegate 
from the United States, unanimously adopted the following 
recommendation regarding the principle of unity of the family: 
The Conference, considering that the unity of the 
family, the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society, is an essential right of the refugee, and that 
such unity is constantly threatened, and noting with 
satisfaction that, according to the official commentary 
of the ad hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related 
Problems (E/1618, p. 40), the rights granted to a 
refugee are extended to members of his family, 
recommends Governments to take the necessary 
measures for the protection of the refugee’s family 
especially with a view to 
(1) Ensuring that the unity of the refugee’s family is 
maintained particularly in cases where the head of 
the family has fulfilled the necessary conditions for 
admission to a particular country, 
                                                                                                             
232.  Id. 
233.  S. Res. 99, 112th Cong. (2012). 
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(2) The protection of refugees who are minors, in 
particular unaccompanied children and girls, with 
special reference to guardianship and adoption.234 
Multiple international treaties and declarations reaffirm the 
central importance of preserving family unity, as long as doing so is 
consistent with the best interests of the child. 
The ICCPR, to which the United States is a party, provides 
that “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”235 It 
further provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his . . . family.”236 The right to protection 
of the family unit, at a minimum, requires scrutiny of any routine 
separation of arriving minors from accompanying adults, and 
prohibits practices that result—either intentionally or 
unintentionally—in the prolonged and potentially indefinite 
separation of children from their parents. 
Outside the immigration context, arrest and incarceration can 
undeniably result in the involuntary separation of parents from their 
children.237 This, in itself, is a major societal problem. U.S. officials 
have cited this fact as a justification for treating the family 
separation policy just like any other law enforcement operation that 
results in the detention of adults who have custody of minor 
children.238 Under current jurisprudence, family unity concerns also 
                                                                                                             
234.  UNHCR, Note on Family Reunification, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/17 
(Aug. 13, 1981). 
235.  ICCPR, supra note 190, art. 23; see also American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, supra 183, at Art. VI; UDHR Art. 16(3) (providing the 
same rights protection in additional human rights documents that the United 
States has signed). 
236.  ICCPR Art. 17(1); see also American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, supra 183, at Art. V; UDHR, Art. 12 (providing similar rights 
protections in additional human rights documents that the United States has 
signed). 
237.  See, e.g., LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, PARENTS IN 
PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN (2008), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/pptmc.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3D2-59R2] (reporting data on the rapid increase 
of incarcerated parents, and their minor children, held in state or federal prisons 
in the United States); see also INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF 
POLICE, SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN OF ARRESTED PARENTS (2014), 
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Safeguarding-Children-of-Arrested-
Parents-Final_Web_v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6MP-KS2R] (reporting on trauma 
experienced by children who have parents in prison or in jail). 
238.  Note that under U.S. law, individual officers can be held liable if 
children of arrested parents are subjected to a “state-created danger” on account 
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do not invariably prevent the removal of inadmissible aliens under 
applicable U.S. law, even if they have minor children who are U.S. 
citizens. 
Whatever the doctrinal and policy justifications might be for 
other government actions that result in family separation based on an 
adult’s alleged unlawful acts, they do not justify the policy of 
routinely separating migrant and refugee children from their parents 
at the border without any individualized assessment or proceeding.239 
The choices to close or dramatically restrict crossings at ports of 
entry, to treat all crossings between points of entry as crimes that 
warrant prosecution, to detain adults and children separately with no 
reliable means of regular contact or even identification, and to return 
adults to their countries of origin without any reliable information 
about their children’s status or whereabouts, all show an utter 
disregard for the international legal principle that families deserve 
protection as such. 
D. The Right to Be Free from Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment 
In addition to the above violations, the photos and first-hand 
accounts of the treatment of children (and adults) in immigration 
detention centers depict treatment that is cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading under any reasonable interpretation of this concept, and 
thus prohibited under the ICCPR and the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT).240 Whether caused by inadequate allocation of 
                                                                                                             
of the separation. See L. Cary Unkelbach, No Duty to Protect: Two Exceptions, 
POLICE CHIEF, July 2004, at 12–14. 
239.  Mass family separations have also been documented deep inside the 
border, as a result of so-called immigration “raids.” See Angela Fritz & Luis 
Velarde, ICE Arrested Hundreds of People in Raids, Now “Devastated” Children 
Are Without Their Parents, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.washington 
post.com/immigration/2019/08/08/ice-arrested-hundreds-people-raids-now-
devastated-children-are-without-their-parents/ (on file with the Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review); Sarah Folwer, Where Are Mom and Dad? School on Standby 
to Help Children in Aftermath of ICE Raids, CLARION LEDGER (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://eu.clarionledger.com/story/news/2019/08/07/what-happens-children-people-
detained-ms-ice-raids-immigration/1947642001/ [https://perma.cc/ZD5Z-B9UC]. 
240.  Lizzie O’Leary, ‘Children Were Dirty, They Were Scared, and They 
Were Hungry,’ ATLANTIC (June 25, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/ 
archive/2019/06/child-detention-centers-immigration-attorney-interview/592540/ 
(on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). Some of these issues are 
not new, but their scope and scale are. For previous reports on immigration 
detention conditions, see, e.g., Inter-American Comm’n on Human Rights, 
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resources, incompetent management, and—as appears  
likely—deliberate indifference, the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment is absolute and non-derogable. As the ICCPR 
makes clear, “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated 
with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person,”241 and “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman[,] or degrading treatment or punishment.”242 The 
CAT, which the United States has also ratified, obligates states 
parties to “prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not 
amount to torture . . . when such acts are committed by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent of a public official or other personal 
acting in an official capacity.”243 
The Martens Clause, which first appeared in the 1899 Hague 
Convention on the laws and customs of war on land, famously invokes 
“the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience” 
as the minimum standard of protection absent directly applicable 
treaty provisions.244 Although the scope and nature of the clause have 
been debated ever since, the idea that—in peacetime as in  
wartime—there are certain fundamental obligations that we owe to 
other human beings as a legal, not just a moral, matter remains 
essential.245 Although the Trump Administration continues to invoke 
state sovereignty as a shield against international standards (while 
                                                                                                             
Refugees and Migrants in the United States: Families and Unaccompanied 
Children (July 24, 2015), OAS/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 16 (July 24, 2015), 
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Refugees-Migrants-US.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2EQR-BTKF] (discussing conditions). On the carve-out for “lawful 
sanctions,” see Ilascu v. Moldova, App. No. 48787/99, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 46,1121 
(2004); David Weissbrodt & Cheryl Heilman, Defining Torture and Cruel, 
Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 29 L. & INEQ. 343, 391–93 (2011). 
241.  ICCPR art. 10(1). 
242.  Id. art. 7. 
243.  CAT art. 16(1). The Convention defines “torture” as “any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person” for purposes such as “punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or 
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.” Id. art. 
1(1). 
244.  Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Preamble, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803. 
245.  See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 
22 (April 9) (“Such obligations are based . . . on certain general and well-
recognized principles, namely elementary considerations of humanity, even more 
exacting in peace than in war . . . .”). 
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at the same time selectively condemning other countries for violating 
such standards), the idea that states no longer have a free hand to 
mistreat their own citizens—let alone other countries’ citizens—is too 
deeply enmeshed in the fabric of international law for such 
disavowals to absolve the United States of any responsibility to act 
with basic human decency. An anti-dehumanization principle, 
grounded in international legal instruments and born of the lessons 
of history, must guide official U.S. actions, whether or not it can be 
enforced as such in a court of law. 
E. The Right to a Remedy 
Historically, aliens injured by another country’s government 
could seek redress by having their own government “espouse” their 
claim diplomatically. This avenue of recourse is more difficult, 
however, when the victims are refugees and migrants who are fleeing 
their countries of origin, although the right to consular notification 
continues to provide a crucial—if far from adequate—check on the 
abuse of foreign citizens.246 In the end, the most important leverage 
other countries have in pressuring the United States to live up to its 
                                                                                                             
246.  See generally Stefanie Grant, Consular Protection, Legal Identity and 
Migrants’ Rights: Time for Convergence?, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI: MIDDLE 
EAST CENTRE BLOG (May 17, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2019/05/17/ 
consular-protection-legal-identity-and-migrants-rights-time-for-convergence/ 
[https://perma.cc/CQD6-H8M7] (discussing convergence of consular protection and 
human rights protection). Any foreign citizen arrested in the United States has 
the right to consular notification under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (VCCR). See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr. 24, 
1963, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; see also Cindy G. Buys, Scott D. Pollock & Ioana N. 
Pellicer, Do Unto Others: The Importance of Better Compliance with Consular 
Notification Rights, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT. L. 461, 463 (2011) (explaining that 
VCCR Article 36(l)(b) states that “if requested by a foreign national, the 
authorities of the receiving state shall, without delay, inform the consular post of 
the sending state that a national of that state has been arrested, committed to 
prison or to custody pending trial, or detained in any other manner”). When ICE 
conducted a massive raid at agricultural processing plants in Mississippi, Mexico 
reportedly sent consular staff to the area to provide assistance to affected Mexican 
nationals. See US Immigration: ICE Arrests Nearly 700 People in Mississippi 
Raids, BBC (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-49275109 
[https://perma.cc/7U26-PBEA]. But cf. Liz Robbins, Hundreds of Separated 
Children Have Quietly Been Sent to New York, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/nyregion/children-separated-border-new-
york.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (reporting that 
“[t]he consulates in New York for Honduras and El Salvador said they, too, were 
unclear how many of their young citizens were in the city, and of how to reach 
their relatives back home”). 
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own erstwhile ideals may well be political rather than legal. Although 
the current administration seems somewhat impervious to “naming 
and shaming” as a technique for promoting compliance with 
international human rights standards, there will presumably come a 
point at which the U.S. electorate will put pressure on leaders to 
rectify the United States’ international moral standing. 
It is also worth noting that, although most legal actions 
challenging detention conditions in U.S. courts allege violations of 
applicable statutes and provisions of the U.S. Constitution,247 at least 
one civil suit has successfully challenged immigration detention 
conditions under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)—a law which gives 
federal courts jurisdiction over a limited number of international law 
violations that “touch and concern” U.S. territory.248 The ATS was 
originally enacted to allow foreigners in the United States to 
vindicate their international legal rights in U.S. courts.249 More than 
a century and a half later, the drafters of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights emphasized that “[e]veryone has the right to an 
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts 
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or 
by law.”250 However, as indicated above, the United States has been 
                                                                                                             
247.  See, e.g., Doe v. Kelly, 878 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2017) (reviewing a lower 
court decision in which Plaintiffs alleged that DHS detention center conditions 
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reticent to make legally binding commitments commensurate with 
the aspirations it has endorsed in the Universal Declaration and 
other “soft law” instruments.251 This is true of the right to a remedy, 
which remains limited for both domestic and international law 
violations. 
The United States has not disavowed all concern for foreign 
children. In an August 2019 statement delivered at the United 
Nations, the U.S. representative declared as follows: 
For our part, the United States continues to prioritize 
child protection programming that is life-saving and 
essential for survival as well as longer-term recovery, 
resilience and healing, and we will continue to invest 
in preventive and responsive programming to protect 
children from violence. We know that the resumption 
of familiar, safe, and nurturing routines, particularly 
within a family, helps children heal, build resilience, 
and better cope with stress.252 
The standards of treatment the United States urges for 
children in armed conflict must also be reflected in our treatment of 
children seeking refuge in the United States. Indeed, the United 
States declared in November 2017 that it remained “committed to 
ensuring that migrant children, including those in the custody of the 
U.S. government, are treated in a safe, dignified, and secure manner 
and with special concern for their particular vulnerabilities.”253 In the 
end, it might be less a question of imposing international standards 
on the United States, and more a matter of ensuring—through the 
mobilization of civil society groups, other governments, international 
organizations, and the U.S. electorate—that the United States lives 
up to the commitments it has already made. 
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CONCLUSION 
Both domestic and international law prohibit the deliberate 
separation of children from their families as a means of attempting to 
deter unlawful immigration. In addition to putting a definitive end to 
the practice of family separation, and to ensuring that the conditions 
and duration of immigration detention comply with domestic and 
international standards, there are several additional legislative and 
oversight avenues for Congress to pursue. 
An immediate step that Congress can take is to enact 
legislation mandating the reunification of any remaining children 
separated by the policies implemented in 2017 and 2018, and any 
additional children that have been separated since that time, 
consistent with federal court order. While court order should be 
sufficient, there have been substantial delays since the court first 
ordered reunification and the completion of that process. Accordingly, 
legislation is likely necessary. 
Congress can also mandate mechanisms for children and 
parents (or relatives or guardians) who are separated at the border to 
be adequately tracked electronically through a system that is modern, 
accurate, and interoperable across relevant government agencies. 
Congress should also legislate requirements for a parent, guardian, or 
appropriate representative to appear on behalf of children in 
immigration proceedings. Specific legislation tied to appropriations is 
needed under these circumstances—given the executive branch’s 
unwillingness to put into place proper bureaucratic mechanisms to 
promptly reunify families following the 2018 court order—to provide 
appropriate parental accompaniment to children at administrative 
hearings. 
Congress should conduct additional oversight and inquiry to 
determine if legislative action could expedite litigation, which is 
building toward individual compensation for victims of the family 
separation and zero tolerance policies and practices. Most simply, 
Congress could explicitly authorize a Bivens action to address the 
situation. In Ziglar, the Supreme Court made it clear that, with 
Congress’s authorization, there would be no issue with extending 
Bivens actions to so-called “new contexts.”254 Clarifying the 
availability of Bivens actions for separated families would be a 
significant step in the right direction, both from the perspective of 
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providing remedy for past actions, and as a deterrent for future 
implementation of a family separation policy. 
With additional hearings and oversight by Congress, 
members of both chambers may come to the understanding that the 
Trump Administration’s practice of intentional family separation 
circa 2018 constituted a mass tort perpetrated by the executive 
branch of the U.S. government. While there is controversy about 
substituting regulation and compensation funds for traditional tort 
recovery in the mass tort context, a well-designed scheme may be best 
for efficient and effective compensation for victims of family 
separation. Moreover, even if such legislation is not ultimately 
passed, legislative consideration of such a proposal may serve as a 
deterrent to the executive branch in considering similar policies in 
the future.255 
It lies beyond the scope of this article to explore the specifics 
of a legislatively authorized alternative to traditional tort actions and 
constitutional damages claims. Nonetheless, with likely over four 
thousand children affected by the Trump Administration’s family 
separation policy and practice, this may be a situation ripe for an 
umbrella remedy. When powerful entities inflict damage on a large 
number of individuals—and not all victims can be immediately 
identified nor can the emergence of the full extent of their injuries be 
readily determined—creating an ongoing mechanism to identify 
victims and to handle their needs for compensation and medical care 
may make sense.256 As with other situations where Congress has 
created programs like this,257 or powerful defendants have agreed to 
create and fund them,258 the backdrop to such a program for victims 
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of the family separation policy will be the already rising tide of more 
traditional lawsuits. 
Congress can also explore specific amendments to 
immigration law in order to affect future conduct by the executive 
branch. For example, Congress should consider establishing a 
presumption, set in law, that children remain with their parent, 
absent a magistrate’s (or administrative judge’s) determination that 
separation is in the best interests of the child. The government should 
have the burden of proving separation and placement in government 
facility is necessary for the best interests of the child. While the law 
should include exceptions for children who are legitimately 
unaccompanied or whose safety and well-being mandates government 
custody, the law should be clear that children cannot be detained in 
government custody for potentially indefinite periods, and that the 
executive branch cannot separate children from accompanying adults 
merely because the adults have been charged with improper entry—a 
violation that often results in a penalty of time served. Immigration 
law should also be amended to direct that immigration policies and 
enforcement may not be intentionally punitive, consistent with 
historical judicial precedent. Overall, Congress should exercise its 
budget and oversight authority to influence executive branch 
activities that focus on expediting immigration processing, including 
asylum claims, versus expanding a bureaucracy focused on detention. 
Finally, notwithstanding the United States’ non-ratification of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Congress should ensure 
that U.S. policies live up to the representation that domestic laws are 
already sufficient to protect children’s rights and interests. 
Legislators should take steps to ensure that the executive branch acts 
consistently at home with the principles it espouses abroad. Even 
without ratifying international instruments, Congress can build 
protections into domestic law, so that the U.S. government acts in 
accordance with established international standards and consistent 
with basic principles of humanity. 
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